My  Mission  to  London, 
1912-1914 

By 

Karl  Max  Llchnowsky 


:?■/-   •'-■'•■■"? 


:VELATIONS  OF  THE  LAST  GERMAN 
AMBASSADOR  IN  ENGLAND 

AY  MISSION  TO 
LONDON 

1912-1914 

By 

PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY 


With  a  Preface  by 
PROFESSOR  GILBERT  MURRAY 


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V  YORK:    GEORGE  H.  DOR.AN  CpMPANY 

•.  TEN  CENTS 


v.. 


■C^H. 


MY  MISSION  TO  LONDON 


PRINCE      LIGHNOWSKY 


MY  MISSION  TO 
LONDON 

1912-1914 


.BY 

PRINCE  LICHNOWSKY 

Late  German  Ambassador  in  England 


WITH  A  PREFACE  BY 

PROFESSOR  GILBERT  MURRAY 

Author  of  "The  Policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,"  etc. 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

The  author  of  the  following  pages,  Karl  Max,  Prince 
Lichnowsky,  is  a  member  of  a  family  which  holds  es- 
tates both  in  German  and  Austrian  Silesia,  and  has  an 
hereditary  seat  in  the  Upper  House  of  the  Prussian 
Diet.  The  father  of  the  present  Prince  and  his  predeces- 
sor in  the  title  was  a  Prussian  cavalry  general,  who, 
at  the  end  of  his  life,  sat  for  some  years  in  the  Reichs- 
tag as  a  member  of  the  Free  Conservative  Party. 

His  uncle,  Prince  Felix,  was  elected  in  1848  to  rep- 
resent Ratibor  in  the  German  National  Assembly  at 
Frankfort-on-Main ;  he  was  an  active  member  of  the 
Conservative  wing,  and  during  the  September  rising, 
while  riding  with  General  Auerswald  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  city,  was  attacked  and  murdered  by  the 
mob. 

The  present  Prince,  after  serving  in  the  Prussian 
army,  in  which  he  holds  the  rank  of  Major,  entered  the 
diplomatic  service.  He  was  in  1885  for  a  short  time  at- 
tached to  the  German  Embassy  in  London,  and  after- 
wards became  Councillor  of  Embassy  in  Vienna.  From 
1899  to  1904  he  was  employed  in  the  German  Foreign 
Office,  and  received  the  rank  and  title  of  Minister  Pleni- 
potentiary. 

In  1904  he  retired  to  his  Silesian  estates,  and,  as  he 
states,  lived  for  eight  years  the  life  of  a  country  gen- 
tleman, but  read  industriously  and  published  occasional 
political  articles.  He  himself  recounts  the  circumstances 
in  which  he  was  appointed  Ambassador  in  London  on 
the  death  of  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein. 

Baron  Marschall,  who  had  been  Secretary  for  For- 


307302 


vi  Biographical  Note 

eign  Affairs  under  the  Chancellorships  of  Count  Caprivi 
and  for  a  time  under  Prince  Hohenlohe,  had  achieved 
great  success  as  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  and  also, 
from  the  German  point  of  view,  as  chief  German  Pleni- 
potentiary at  the  Second  Hague  Conference  in  1907. 
Baron  Marschall  was,  to  use  an  expression  of  Bismarck's, 
"the  best  horse  in  Germany's  diplomatic  stable."  And 
great  things  were  expected  of  him  in  London.  But  he 
lived  only  a  few  months  after  his  appointment. 

Prince  Lichnowsky's  high  social  rank,  his  agreeable 
manners,  and  the  generous  hospitality  which  he  showed 
in  Carlton  House  Terrace  gave  him  a  position  in  English 
society  which  facilitated  the  negotiations  between  Eng- 
land and  Germany,  and  did  much  to  diminish  the  fric- 
tion that  had  arisen  during  the  time  that  Prince  Biilow 
held  the  post  of  German  Chancellor. 

The  pamphlet  which  is  here  translated  gives  an  account 
of  his  London  mission;  after  his  return  to  Germany 
he  has  lived  in  retirement  in  the  country,  but  has  con- 
tributed occasional  articles  to  the  Press.  The  pamphlet, 
which  was  written  in  August,  1916,  was  not  intended 
for  publication,  but  was  distributed  confidentially  to  a 
few  friends.  The  existence  of  it  had  long  been  known, 
but  it  was  only  in  March  of  this  year  that  for  the  first 
time  extracts  from  it  were  published  in  the  Swedish 
paper  Politiken.  Longer  extracts  have  since  appeared 
in  the  London  Press ;  for  the  first  time  a  complete 
translation  made  from  the  German  original  is  now  placed 
before  the  public. 


PREFACE 

Never  perhaps  in  history  has  the  world  seen  so  great 
an  exhibition,  as  at  the  outbreak  of  this  war,  of  the 
murderous  and  corrupting  power  of  the  organised  He. 
All  Germany  outside  the  governmental  circles  was  in- 
duced to  believe  that  the  war  was  a  treacherous  at- 
tack, plotted  in  the  dark  by  "revengeful  France,  bar- 
baric Russia,  and  envious  England,"  against  the  innocent 
and  peace-loving  Fatherland.  And  the  centre  of  the 
plot  was  the  Machiavellian  Grey,  who  for  long  years 
had  been  encircling  and  strangling  Germany  in  order 
at  the  chosen  moment  to  deal  her  a  death-blow  from 
behind.  The  Emperor,  the  princes,  the  ministers,  the 
bishops  and  chaplains,  the  historians  and  theologians, 
in  part  consciously  and  in  part  innocently,  vied  with 
one  another  in  solemn  attestations  and  ingenious  forgeries 
of  evidence ;  and  the  people,  docile  by  training  and  long 
indoctrinated  to  the  hatred  of  England,  inevitably  be- 
lieved and  passionately  exaggerated  what  they  were  told. 
From  this  belief,  in  large  part,  came  the  strange  bru- 
talities and  ferocities  of  the  common  people  of  Ger- 
many at  the  opening  of  the  war,  whether  towards  per- 
sons who  had  a  right  to  courtesy,  like  the  Ambassa- 
dors, or  a  claim  on  common  human  sympathy,  like  the 
wounded  and  the  prisoners.  The  German  masses  could 
show  no  mercy  towards  people  guilty  of  so  hideous  a 
world-crime. 

And  now  comes  evidence,  which  in  normal  times  would 
convince  even  the  German  nation,  that  the  whole  basis 
of  their  belief  was  a  structure  of  deliberate  falsehood; 
which  shows  that  it  was  the  Kaiser  and  his  Ministers 

vii 


viii  Preface 

who  plotted  the  war;  while  it  was  England,  and  espe- 
cially Sir  Edward  Grey,  who  strove  hardest  for  the 
preservation  of  peace. 

It  is  the  evidence  of  the  German  Ambassador  in  Lon- 
don during  the  years  1912-1914,  Prince  Lichnowsky, 
corroborated  rather  than  confuted  by  the  comments  of 
Herr  von  jagow,  who  was  Foreign  Minister  at  the 
time,  and  carried  further  by  the  recently  published  Mem- 
oranda of  Herr  Miihlon,  one  of  the  directors  of  the 
Krupp  armament  factory  at  Essen.  One  could  hardly 
imagine  more  convincing  testimony.  Will  the  German 
people  believe  it?  Would  they  believe  now  if  one 
rose  from  the  dead? 

We  cannot  yet  guess  at  the  answer.  Indeed,  there  is 
another  question  which  must  be  answered  first:  For 
what  motive,  and  with  what  possible  change  of  policy 
in  view,  has  the  German  Government  permitted  the 
publication  of  these  papers  and  the  circulation  of  Lich- 
nowsky's  Memorandum  as  a  pamphlet  at  30  pfennig? 
Do  the  militarists  think  their  triumph  is  safe,  and  the 
time  come  for  them  to  throw  off  the  mask?  Or  have 
the  opponents  of  militarism,  who  seemed  so  crushed, 
succeeded  in  asserting  their  power?  Is  it  a  plan  to 
induce  the  ever  docile  German  populace  to  hate  England 
less? 

It  must  be  a  startling  story  for  the  Germans,  but  for 
us  it  contains  little  that  is  new.  It  is  an  absolute  con- 
firmation, in  spirit  and  in  letter,  of  the  British  Blue  Book 
and  of  English  books  such  as  Mr.  Headlam's  "History 
of  Twelve  Days"  and  Mr.  Archer's  "Thirteen  Days." 
Prince  Lichnowsky's  summing-up  agrees  exactly  with 
the  British  conclusions :  The  Germans  encouraged  Count 
Berchtold  to  attack  Serbia,  well  knowing  the  conse- 
quences to  expect ;  between  the  23rd  and  30th  July  they 
rejected  all  forms  of  mediation;  and  on  the  30th  July, 
when  Austria  wished  to  withdraw,  they  hastily  sent  an 


Preface  ix 

ultimatum  to  Russia  so  as  to  make  withdrawal  impos- 
sible (pp.  39-40).  A  ghastly  story  of  blindness  and 
crime ;  but  we  knew  it  all  before. 

Equally  interesting  is  Prince  Lichnowsky's  account 
of  the  policy  of  Germany  and  England  before  the  war. 
He  confirms  our  knowledge  of  the  "sinister  vagueness" 
of  German  policy  in  Morocco,  the  steady  desire  of 
England  to  come  to  an  understanding  and  of  Germany 
to  elude  an  understanding.  As  for  our  alleged  envy  of 
German  trade,  it  was  in  English  commercial  circles  that 
the  desire  for  an  understanding  with  Germany  was 
strongest.  As  for  our  "policy  of  encirclement,"  it  was 
the  deliberate  aim  of  our  policy,  continuing  the  line  of 
Lord  Salisbury  and  Mr.  Chamberlain,  to  facilitate  rather 
than  hinder  the  legitimate  and  peaceful  expansion  of  a 
great  force,  which  would  become  dangerous  if  sup- 
pressed and  confined. 

The  test  cases  were  the  Bagdad  Railway  and  the  Por- 
tuguese Colonies.  We  agreed  to  make  no  objection  to 
Germany's  buying  them  when  Portugal  was  willing  to 
sell ;  we  agreed  in  the  meantime  to  treat  them  as  a 
German  sphere  of  interest  and  not  to  compete  for  in- 
fluence there.  We  agreed,  subject  to  the  conservation 
of  existing  British  rights  and  to  certain  other  safe- 
guards, to  the  completion  of  the  great  railway  from  the 
Bosphorus  to  Basra,  and  to  the  recognition  of  the  whole 
district  tapped  by  the  railway  as  a  German  sphere  of 
interest.  The  two  treaties,  though  completed,  were  never 
signed ;  why .''  Because  Grey  would  sign  no  secret  treaty. 
He  insisted  that  they  must  be  published.  And  the  Ger- 
man Government  would  not  allow  them  to  be  published! 
To  Lichnowsky  this  seemed  like  mere  spite  on  the  part 
of  rivals  who  grudged  his  success,  but  we  see  now  that 
it  was  a  deliberate  policy.  The  war-makers  could  not 
afford  to  let  their  people  know  the  proof  of  England's 
goodwill. 


X  Preface 

Lichnowsky  was  a  friend  of  England,  but  he  was  no 
pacifist  or  "little  German."  His  policy  was  to  favour 
the  peaceful  expansion  of  Germany,  in  good  understand- 
ing with  England  and  France,  on  the  seas  and  in  the 
colonies.  He  aimed  at  "imperial  development"  on  Brit- 
ish lines;  he  abhorred  the  "Triple  Alliance  policy"  of 
espousing  Austria's  quarrels,  backing  Turkey  against  the 
Balkan  States,  intriguing  against  Russia,  and  seeing  all 
politics  in  the  terms  of  European  rivalries  with  a  back- 
ground of  war.  His  own  policy  was  one  which,  if  fol- 
lowed loyally  by  the  German  Government,  would  have 
avoided  the  war  and  saved  Europe. 

There  are  one  or  two  traits  in  Lichnowsky's  language 
which  show  that,  with  all  his  liberality  of  thought,  he  is 
still  a  German.  He  accepts  at  once,  on  the  report  of  a 
German  secret  agent,  the  false  statement  that  Grey  had 
concluded  a  secret  treaty  with  France.  He  mentions, 
as  if  it  were  a  natural  thing,  the  strange  opinion  that 
the  Standard  was  "apparently  bought  by  Austria."  He 
describes  Mr.  Asquith  as  a  pacifist  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
as  both  a  pacifist  and,  ideally  and  practically,  a  Socialist. 
One  must  remember  the  sort  of  views  he  was  accustomed 
to  at  Potsdam. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Lichnowsky  was  delib- 
erately deceived  by  his  Government,  and  not  much  that 
he  was  chosen  for  his  post  in  London  with  a  view  to 
deceiving  us.  These  things  are  all  in  gospel  according 
to  Bernhardi.  Lichnowsky  himself  was  both  an  honest 
and  an  able  diplomatist,  and  there  is  the  ring  of  sincerity 
in  his  words  of  self-reproach:  "I  had  to  support  in 
London  a  policy  the  heresy  of  which  I  recognised.  That 
brought  down  vengeance  on  me,  for  it  was  a  sin  against 
the  Holy  Ghost." 

If  Grey,  in  the  tangle  of  terrific  problems  that  sur- 
rounded him,  ever  erred,  his  sin  was  not  against  the 
Holy  Ghost.     The  attack  made  on  him  at  the  ouset  of 


Preface  xi 

the  war  by  Radical  idealists  was  easy  to  confute.  If 
ever  a  statesman  strove,  with  due  prudence,  for  peace, 
for  friendship  between  nations,  for  a  transformation  of 
armed  rivalries  into  cordial  and  democratic  under- 
standings, our  great  English  Minister  was  that  man.  He 
was  accused  as  a  maker  of  secret  treaties;  and  we  find 
him  all  through  the  times  of  peace,  and  through  all  times 
when  choice  was  still  possible,  a  steady  refuser  of 
secret  treaties.  He  was  accused  as  a  seeker  for  terri- 
tory; and  we  find  him,  both  in  war  and  peace,  steadily 
opposing  all  territorial  aggrandisement.  Such  was  the 
policy  approved  by  the  leaders  of  both  English  parties 
before  the  war. 

It  is  an  attack  from  the  other  side  that  now  reaches 
him.  If  the  war  had  been  short  and  successful,  this 
would  not  have  occurred.  But  a  long  and  bitter  and 
dangerous  war  of  necessity  creates  its  own  atmosphere, 
and  the  policy  that  was  wisdom  in  19 13,  when  the  world 
was  at  peace  and  our  relations  with  Germany  were  im- 
proving, strikes  us  now  perhaps  as  strangely  trustful 
and  generous.  Yet,  if  we  try  to  recover  that  mental 
calm  without  which  the  nations  will  never  till  the  end 
of  time  be  able  to  restore  their  wasted  wealth  and  re- 
build the  shattered  hopes  of  civilisation,  I  think  most 
Englishmen  will  agree  that  Grey's  policy  was,  as  we 
all  thought  it  at  the  time,  the  right  and  the  wise  policy. 
To  let  all  the  world  know  that  we  would  never  join  in 
any  attack  on  Germany,  but  would  never  permit  any 
attack  on  France;  to  seek  to  remove  all  causes  of  fric- 
tion between  England  and  Germany,  as  they  had  been 
removed  between  England  and  France  and  between  Eng- 
land and  Russia;  to  extend  the  "Entente  Cordiale"  by 
gradual  steps  to  all  nations  who  would  come  into  it,  and 
to  "bring  the  two  groups  of  Europe  nearer."  This 
was  the  right  policy,  whether  it  succeeded  or  failed; 


xii  Preface 

and  it  will,  in  spirit  at  leas^-,   some  day  be  the  right 
policy  again. 

No  Englishman,  I  think,  will  regret  the  generous  cour- 
tesy which  sent  off  the  German  Ambassador  with  a  guard 
of  honour,  "like  a  departing  sovereign."  No  one  will  re- 
gret our  Prime  Minister's  silent  tears  when  the  war  be- 
came inevitable,  or  Grey's  conviction  that  it  would  be 
"the  greatest  catastrophe  in  history" — not  even  if  mad 
German  militarists  drew  the  conclusion  that  the  only 
motive  for  such  grief  must  be  the  fear  of  defeat.  For 
my  own  part  I  am  glad  that,  at  the  last  interview  with 
Lichnowsky,  Grey  assured  him  that,  if  ever  a  chance 
came  of  m.ediation  between  the  combatants,  he  would 
take  it,  and  that  "we  have  never  wished  to  crush  Ger- 
many." 

Surely,  even  now  in  the  crisis  of  the  war,  it  is  well 
to  remember  these  things.  The  cleaner  our  national  con- 
science the  keener  surely  will  be  our  will  to  victory.  The 
slower  we  were  to  give  up  the  traditions  of  generosity 
and  trustfulness  that  came  from  our  long  security  the 
firmer  will  be  our  resolution  to  hold  out,  through  what- 
ever martyrdom  may  be  yet  in  store  for  us,  until  we  or 
our  children  can  afford  once  more  to  live  generously  and 
to  trust  our  neighbours.  In  the  long  run  no  other  life 
is  worth  living. 

G.  M. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

My  Appointment i 

Morocco  Policy 2 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  Programme 4 

The  Albanian  Question 5 

The  Near  East  and  the  Policy  of  the  Triple  Alliance  7 

The  Conference  or  Ambassadors 10 

The  Balkan  Conference 12 

The  Second  Balkan  War 13 

LiMAN  Von  Sanders 14 

The  Colonial  Treaty iS 

The  Bagdad  Treaty 20 

The  Question  of  the  Navy 21 

Commercial  Jealousy 23 

The  Court  and  Society 24 

Sir  Edward  Grey 26 

Mr.  Asquith 28 

Nicholson .  29 

Tyrrell 3° 

Attitude  of  the  German  Foreign  Office 30 

In  Case  of  War 31 

The  Serbian  Crisis 31 

ziii 


xiv  Contents 

PAGE 

The  English  Declaration  of  War 37 

Retrospect 3^ 

My  Return 40 

The  Question  of  Responsibility 4° 

The  Enemy  Point  of  View 41 

Bismarck 42 

Our  Future 43 


MY  MISSION  TO  LONDON 


MY  MISSION  TO  LONDON 

1912-14 


My   Appointment 

In  September,  191 2,  Baron  Marschall  died  after  he  had 
only  been  at  his  post  in  London  for  a  few  months.  His 
appointment,  which  no  doubt  was  principally  due  to  his 
age  and  the  desire  of  his  junior  officer  to  go  to  London, 
was  one  of  the  many  mistakes  of  our  policy. 

In  spite  of  his  striking  personality  and  great  reputa- 
tion, he  was  too  old  and  too  tired  to  adjust  himself  to 
the  Anglo-Saxon  world,  which  was  completely  alien  to 
him;  he  was  rather  an  official  and  a  lawyer  than  a 
diplomat  and  statesman.  From  the  very  beginning  he 
was  at  great  pains  to  convince  the  English  of  the  harm- 
lessness  of  our  fleet,  and  naturally  this  only  produced 
the  contrary  effect. 

Much  to  my  surprise,  I  was  offered  the  post  in  Octo- 
ber. I  had  retired  to  the  country  as  a  "Personalreferent" 
after  many  years  of  activity,  there  being  then  no  suitable 
post  available  for  me.  I  passed  my  time  between  flax 
and  turnips,  among  horses  and  meadows,  read  exten- 
sively, and  occasionally  published  political  essays. 

Thus  I  had  spent  eight  years,  and  it  was  thirteen 
since  I  had  left  the  Embassy  at  Vienna  with  tlie  rank 
of  Envoy.  That  had  been  my  last  real  sphere  of  politi- 
cal activity,  as  in  those  days  such  activity  was  im- 
possible unless  one  was  prepared  to  help  a  half-crazy 


2  My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

chief  in  drafting  his  crotchety  orders  with  their  crabbed 
instructions. 

I  do  not  know  who  was  responsible  for  my  being 
appointed  to  London.  It  was  certainly  not  due  to  H.M. 
alone — I  was  not  one  of  his  intimates,  though  he  was 
at  all  times  gracious  to  me,  I  also  know  by  experi- 
ence that  his  nominees  generally  met  with  successful 
opposition.  Herr  von  Kiderlen  had  really  wanted  to 
send  Herr  von  Stumm  to  London!  He  immediately 
manifested  unmistakable  ill-will  towards  me,  and  en- 
deavoured to  intimidate  me  by  his  incivility.  Herr  von 
Bethmann  Hollweg  was  at  that  time  kindly  disposed 
towards  me,  and  had  paid  me  a  visit  at  Gratz  only  a 
short  time  before.  I  am  therefore  inclined  to  think 
that  they  all  agreed  on  me  because  no  other  candidate 
was  available  at  the  moment.  But  for  Baron  Marschall's 
unexpected  death,  I  should  no  more  have  been  called 
out  of  retirement  then  than  at  any  other  time  during 
all  those  previous  years. 

Morocco  Policy 

It  was  certainly  the  right  moment  for  a  new  effort  to 
establish  better  relations  with  England.  Our  enigmatic 
Morocco  policy  had  repeatedly  shaken  confidence  in  our 
pacific  intentions.  At  the  very  least,  it  had  given  rise 
to  the  suspicion  that  we  did  not  quite  know  what  we 
wanted,  or  that  it  was  our  object  to  keep  Europe  on 
the  qui  vive,  and,  when  opportunity  offered,  to  humiliate 
France.  An  Austrian  colleague,  who  had  been  in  Paris 
for  a  long  time,  said  to  me:  "Whenever  the  French 
begin  to  forget  about  revanche,  you  always  remind  them 
of  it  with  a  jack-boot." 

After  we  had  repulsed  M.  Delcasse's  efforts  to  arrive 
at  an  understanding  with  us  about  Morocco,  and  prior 
to  that  had  formally  declared  that  we  had  no  political 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914  3 

interests  there — which  conformed  to  the  traditions  of 
the  Bismarckian  policy — we  suddenly  discovered  a  sec- 
ond Kriiger  in  Abdul  Aziz.  We  assured  him  also,  like 
the  Boers,  of  the  protection  of  the  mighty  German 
Empire,  with  the  same  display  and  the  same  result; 
both  demonstrations  terminated  with  our  retreat,  as 
they  were  bound  to  do,  if  we  had  not  already  made  up 
our  minds  to  embark  on  the  world-war.  The  distressing 
congress  at  Algeqiras  could  not  change  this  in  any  way, 
still  less  the  fall  of  M.  Delcasse. 

Our  attitude  promoted  the  Russo-Japanese  and  later 
the  Anglo- Japanese  rapprochement.  In  face  of  "the  Ger- 
man Peril"  all  other  differences  faded  into  the  back- 
ground. The  possibility  of  a  new  Franco-German  war 
had  become  apparent,  and  such  a  war  could  not,  as  in 
1870,  leave  either  Russia  or  England  unaffected. 

The  uselessness  of  the  Triple  Alliance  had  been  shown 
at  Algegiras,  while  that  of  the  agreements  arrived  at 
there  was  demonstrated  shortly  afterwards  by  the  col- 
lapse of  the  Sultanate,  which,  of  course,  could  not  be 
prevented.  Among  the  German  people,  however,  the  be- 
lief gained  ground  that  our  foreign  policy  was  feeble 
and  was  giving  way  before  the  "Encirclement" — that 
high-sounding  phrases  were  succeeded  by  pusillanimous 
surrender. 

It  is  to  the  credit  of  Herr  von  Kiderlen,  who  is 
otherwise  overrated  as  a  statesman,  that  he  wound  up 
our  Moroccan  inheritance  and  accepted  as  they  were 
the  facts  that  could  no  longer  be  altered.  Whether, 
indeed,  it  was  necessary  to  alarm  the  world  by  the 
Agadir  incident  I  will  leave  others  to  say.  It  was  jubi- 
lantly acclaimed  in  Germany,  but  it  had  caused  all  the 
more  disquiet  in  England  because  the  Government  were 
kept  waiting  for  three  weeks  for  an  explanation  of 
our  intentions.  Lloyd  George's  speech,  which  was  meant 
as  a  warning  to  us,  was  the  consequence.     Before  Del- 


4  My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

casse's  fall,  and  before  Algegiras,  we  might  have  had  a 
harbour  and  territory  on  the  West  Coast,  but  after 
those  events  it  was  impossible. 


Sir  Edward  Grey's  Programme 

When  I  came  to  London  in  November,  1912,  the  ex- 
citement over  Morocco  had  subsided,  as  an  agreement 
with  France  had  been  reached  in  Berlin.  It  is  true 
that  Haldane's  mission  had  failed,  as  we  had  required 
the  assurance  of  neutrality,  instead  of  being  content 
with  a  treaty  securing  us  against  British  attacks  and 
attacks  with  British  support.  Yet  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  not  relinquished  the  idea  of  arriving  at  an  agree- 
ment with  us,  and  in  the  first  place  tried  to  do  this  in 
colonial  and  economic  questions.  Conversations  were 
in  progress  with  the  capable  and  business-like  Envoy 
von  Kiihlmann  concerning  the  renewal  of  the  Portuguese 
colonial  agreement  and  Mesopotamia  (Badgad  Railway), 
the  una  vowed  object  of  which  was  to  divide  both  the 
colonies  and  Asia  IMinor  into  spheres  of  influence. 

The  British  statesman,  after  having  settled  all  out- 
standing points  of  difference  with  France  and  Russia, 
wished  to  make  similar  agreements  with  us.  It  was  not 
his  object  to  isolate  us,  but  to  the  best  of  his  power 
to  make  us  partners  in  the  existing  association.  As 
he  had  succeeded  in  overcoming  Anglo-French  and  An- 
glo-Russian differences,  so  he  also  wished  to  do  his 
best  to  eliminate  the  Anglo-German,  and  by  a  network 
of  treaties,  which  would  in  the  end  no  doubt  have  led 
to  an  agreement  about  the  troublesome  question  of  naval 
armaments,  to  ensure  the  peace  of  the  world,  after  our 
previous  policy  had  led  to  an  association — the  Entente — 
which  represented  a  mutual  insurance  against  the  risk 
of  war. 

This  was  Sir  E.  Grey's  plan.    In  his  own  words :  With- 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914         5 

out  interfering  with  our  existing  friendship  with  France 
and  Russia,  which  has  no  aggressive  aims  and  does  not 
entail  any  binding  obHgations  on  England,  to  arrive  at 
a  friendly  rapprochement  and  understanding  with  Ger- 
many, "to  bring  the  two  groups  nearer." 

As  with  us,  there  were  two  parties  in  England  at  that 
time — the  Optimists,  who  believed  in  an  understanding, 
and  the  Pessimists,  who  thought  that  sooner  or  later  war 
was  inevitable. 

The  former  embraced  Messrs.  Asquith,  Grey,  Lord 
Haldane,  and  most  of  the  Ministers  in  the  Radical  Cabi- 
net; also  the  leading  Liberal  papers,  such  as  the  West- 
minster Gazette,  Manchester  Guardian,  Daily  Chronicle. 
The  Pessimists  were  mainly  Conservative  politicians  like 
Mr.  Balfour,  who  repeatedly  made  this  clear  to  me; 
also  leading  Army  men,  like  Lord  Roberts,  who  pointed 
out  the  necessity  of  universal  military  service  ("The 
Writing  on  the  Wall")  ;  further,  the  Northcliffe  Press 
and  the  eminent  English  journalist  Mr.  Garvin,  of  The 
Observer.  During  my  period  of  office,  however,  they 
abstained  from  all  attacks,  and  maintained  both  per- 
sonally and  politically  a  friendly  attitude.  But  our  naval 
policy  and  our  attitude  in  1905,  1908,  and  191 1  had 
aroused  in  them  the  conviction  that  after  all  it  would 
some  day  come  to  war.  Just  as  it  is  with  us,  the  former 
are  now  being  accused  in  England  of  short-sightedness 
and  simplicity,  whereas  the  latter  are  looked  on  as  the 
true  prophets. 

The  Albanian  Question 

The  first  Balkan  War  had  led  to  the  collapse  of  Tur- 
key and  thus  to  a  defeat  for  our  policy,  which  had  been 
identified  with  Turkey  for  a  number  of  years.  Since 
Turkey  in  Europe  could  no  longer  be  saved,  there  were 
two  ways  in  which  we  could  deal  with  the  inheritance : 


6         My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

either  we  could  declare  our  complete  disinterestedness 
with  regard  to  the  frontier  delimitations  and  leave  the 
Balkan  Powers  to  settle  them,  or  we  could  support  our 
"Allies"  and  carry  on  a  Triple  Alliance  policy  in  the 
Near  East,  thus  giving  up  the  role  of  mediator. 

From  the  very  beginning  I  advocated  the  former 
course,  but  the  Foreign  Office  emphatically  favoured  the 
latter. 

The  vital  point  was  the  Albanian  question.  Our  Allies 
desired  the  establishment  of  an  independent  Albanian 
state,  as  the  Austrians  did  not  want  the  Serbs  to  obtain 
access  to  the  Adriatic,  and  the  Italians  did  not  want  the 
"Greeks  to  get  to  Valona  or  even  to  the  north  of  Corfu. 
As  opposed  to  this,  Russia,  as  is  known,  was  backing 
Serbia's   wishes   and    France   those   of   Greece. 

My  advice  was  to  treat  this  question  as  outside  the 
scope  of  the  Alliance,  and  to  support  neither  the  Austrian 
nor  the  Italian  claims.  Without  our  aid  it  would  have 
been  impossible  to  set  up  an  independent  Albania,  which, 
as  anyone  could  foresee,  had  no  prospect  of  surviving; 
Serbia  v/ould  have  extended  to  the  sea,  and  the  present 
world-war  would  have  been  avoided.  France  and  Italy 
would  have  quarrelled  over  Greece,  and  if  the  Italians 
had  not  wanted  to  fight  France  unaided  they  would  have 
been  compelled  to  acquiesce  in  Greece's  expansion  to 
the  north  of  Durazzo.  The  greater  part  of  Albania  is 
Hellenic.  The  towns  in  the  south  are  entirely  so ;  and 
during  the  Conference  of  Ambassadors  delegations  from 
principal  towns  arrived  in  London  to  obtain  annexation 
to  Greece.  Even  in  present-day  Greece  there  are  Al- 
banian elements  and  the  so-called  Greek  national  dress 
is  of  Albanian  origin.  The  inclusion  of  the  Albanians, 
who  are  principally  Orthodox  and  Moslem,  in  the  body 
of  the  Greek  state  was  therefore  the  best  and  most 
natural  solution,  if  you  left  Scutari  and  the  north  to 
the  Serbs  and  Montenegrins.    For  dynastic  reasons  H.M. 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914  7 

was  also  in  favour  of  this  solution.  When  I  supported 
this  view  in  a  letter  to  the  monarch  I  received  agitated 
reproaches  from  the  Chancellor;  he  said  that  I  had  the 
reputation  of  being  "an  opponent  of  Austria,"  and  I  was 
to  abstain  from  such  interference  and  direct  correspon- 
dence. 


The  Near  East  and  the  Policy  of 
THE  Triple  Alliance 

We  ought  at  last  to  have  broken  with  the  fatal  tradi- 
tion of  pursuing  a  Triple  Alliance  policy  in  the  Near  East 
also,  and  have  recognised  our  mistake,  which  lay  in  iden- 
tifying ourselves  in  the  south  with  the  Turks  and  in  the 
north  with  the  Austro-Magyars.  For  the  continuance  of 
this  policy,  upon  which  we  had  entered  at  the  Berlin 
Congress,  and  which  we  had  actively  pursued  ever  since, 
was  bound  to  lead  in  time  to  a  conflict  with  Russia  and 
to  the  world-war,  more  especially  if  the  requisite  clev- 
erness were  lacking  in  high  places.  Instead  of  coming 
to  terms  with  Russia  on  a  basis  of  the  independence  of 
the  Sultan,  whom  even  Petrograd  did  not  wish  to  eject 
from  Constantinople,  and  of  confining  ourselves  to  our 
economic  interests  in  the  Near  East  and  to  the  partition- 
ing of  Asia  Minor  into  spheres  of  influence  while  re- 
nouncing any  intention  of  military  or  political  interfer- 
ence, it  v/as  our  political  ambition  to  dominate  on  the 
Bosphorus.  In  Russia  they  began  to  think  that  the  road 
to  Constantinople  and  the  Mediterranean  lay  zna  Berlin. 
Instead  of  supporting  the  active  development  of  the  Bal- 
kan States — which,  once  liberated,  are  anything  rather 
than  Russian,  and  with  which  our  experiences  had  been 
very  satisfactory — we  took  sides  with  the  Turkish  and 
Magyar   oppressors. 

The  fatal  mistake  of  our  Triple  Alliance  and  Near 
East  policy — which  had  forced  Russia,  our  natural  best 


8         My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

friend  and  neighbour,  into  the  arms  of  France  and  Eng- 
land and  away  from  its  policy  of  Asiatic  expansion — 
was  the  more  apparent,  as  a  Franco-Russian  attack, 
which  was  the  sole  hypothesis  that  justified  a  Triple 
Alliance  policy,  could  be  left  out  of  our  calculations. 

The  value  of  the  Italian  alliance  needs  no  further  ref- 
erence. Italy  will  want  our  money  and  our  tourists  even 
after  the  war,  with  or  without  an  alliance.  That  this 
latter  would  fail  us  in  case  of  war  was  patent  before- 
hand. Hence  the  alliance  had  no  value.  Austria  needs 
our  protection  in  war,  as  in  peace,  and  has  no  other  sup- 
port. Her  dependence  on  us  is  based  on  political,  na- 
tional, and  economic  considerations,  and  is  the  greater 
the  more  intimate  our  relations  with  Russia  are.  The 
Bosnian  crisis  taught  us  this.  Since  the  days  of  Count 
Beust  no  Vienna  Minister  has  adopted  such  a  self-confi- 
dent attitude  towards  us  as  Count  Aehrenthal  during 
the  later  years  of  his  life.  If  German  policy  is  con- 
ducted on  right  lines,  cultivating  relations  with  Russia, 
Austria-Hungary  is  our  vassal  and  dependent  on  us, 
even  without  an  alliance  or  recompense ;  if  it  is  wrongly 
conducted,  then  we  are  dependent  on  Austria.  Hence 
there  was  no  reason  for  the  alliance. 

I  knew  Austria  too  well  not  to  be  aware  that  a  return 
to  the  policy  of  Prince  Felix  Schwarzenberg  or  Count 
Moritz  Esterhazy  was  inconceivable  there.  Little  as  the 
Slavs  there  love  us,  just  as  little  do  they  wish  to  return 
into  a  German  Empire  even  with  a  Habsburg-Lorraine 
emperor  at  its  head.  They  are  striving  for  a  federation 
in  Austria  on  national  lines,  a  state  of  things  which 
would  have  even  less  chance  of  being  realised  within  the 
German  Empire  than  under  the  Double  Eagle.  The  Ger- 
mans of  Austria,  however,  acknowledge  Berlin  as  the 
centre  of  German  Might  and  Culture,  and  are  well  aware 
that  Austria  can  never  again  be  the  leading  Power. 
They  wish  for  as  intimate  a  connection  with  the  Ger- 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914  9 

man  Empire  as  possible,  not  for  an  anti-German  policy. 

Since  the  'seventies  the  position  has  fundamentally 
changed  in  Austria,  as  in  Bavaria.  As,  in  the  latter,  a 
return  to  Great  German  separatism  and  old  Bavarian 
policy  is  not  to  be  feared,  so  with  the  former  a  resusci- 
tation of  the  policy  of  Prince  Kaunitz  and  Schwarzen- 
berg  v^as  not  to  be  expected.  By  a  federation  with  Aus- 
tria, however,  which  resembles  a  big  Belgium,  since  its 
population,  even  without  Galicia  and  Dalmatia,  is  only 
about  half  Germanic,  our  interests  would  suffer  as 
much  as  if  we  subordinated  our  policy  to  the  views  of 
Vienna  or  Budapest — thus  espousing  Austria's  quarrels 
{"d'epouser  les  querelles  d'Aiitriche"). 

Hence  we  were  not  obliged  to  take  any  notice  of  the 
desires  of  our  ally ;  they  were  not  only  unnecessary  but 
also  dangerous,  as  they  would  lead  to  a  conflict  with 
Russia  if  we  looked  at  Oriental  questions  through  Aus- 
trian spectacles. 

The  development  of  the  alliance,  from  a  union  formed 
on  a  single  hypothesis  for  a  single  specific  purpose,  into 
a  general  and  unlimited  association,  a  pooling  of  inter- 
ests in  all  spheres,  was  the  best  way  of  producing  that 
which  diplomacy  was  designed  to  prevent — war.  Such 
an  "alliance  policy"  was  also  calculated  to  alienate  from 
us  the  sympathies  of  the  strong,  young,  rising  communi- 
ties in  the  Balkans,  who  were  prepared  to  turn  to  U3 
and  to  open  their  markets  to  us. 

The  difference  between  the  power  of  a  Ruling  House 
and  a  National  State,  between  dynastic  and  democratic 
ideas  of  government,  had  to  be  decided,  and  as  usual 
we  were  on  the  wrong  side. 

King  Carol  told  one  of  our  representatives  that  he  had 
entered  into  the  alliance  with  us  on  the  assumption  that 
we  retained  the  leadership ;  but  if  this  passed  to  Austria, 
that  would  alter  the  foundations  of  the  relationship,  and 


10       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

under  such  circumstances  he  would  not  be  able  to  go  on 
with  it. 

Things  were  similar  in  Serbia,  where,  contrary  to  our 
own  economic  interests,  we  were  supporting  the  Austrian 
policy  of  strangulation. 

Every  time  we  have  backed  the  wrong  horse,  whose 
breakdown  could  have  been  foreseen:  Kriiger,  Abdul 
Aziz,  Abdul  Hamid,  Wilhelm  of  Wied,  ending — the  most 
fatal  of  all  mistakes — with  the  great  plunge  on  the  Berch- 
told  stable. 


The  Conference  of  Ambassadors 

Shortly  after  my  arrival  in  London,  at  the  end  of  191 2, 
Sir  E.  Grey  proposed  an  informal  conversation  to  pre- 
vent the  Balkan  War  developing  into  a  European  one, 
after  we  had  unfortunately  refused,  on  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  to  agree  to  the  French  proposal  of  a  dec- 
laration of  disinterestedness.  The  British  statesman 
from  the  very  beginning  took  up  the  position  that  Eng- 
land had  no  interest  in  Albania,  and  had  no  intention 
of  going  to  war  over  this  question.  He  merely  wished 
to  mediate  between  the  two  groups  as  an  "honest  broker" 
and  smooth  over  difficulties.  He  therefore  by  no  means 
took  sides  with  the  Entente,  and  during  the  eight  months 
or  so  of  the  negotiations  his  goodwill  and  his  authori- 
tative influence  contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  the 
attainment  of  an  agreement.  We,  instead  of  adopting 
an  attitude  similar  to  the  English  one,  invariably  took 
up  the  position  which  was  prescribed  for  us  by  Vienna. 
Count  Mensdorff  was  the  leader  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
in  London;  I  was  his  "second."  It  was  my  duty  to 
support  his  proposals.  That  clever  and  experienced  man 
Count  Szogyenyi  was  conducting  affairs  in  Berlin.  His 
refrain  was  "Then  the  casus  foederis  will  arise,"  and 
when  I  once  ventured  to  doubt  the  truth  of  this  conclu- 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        11 

sion  I  was  severely  reprimanded  for  "Austrophobia." 
It  was  also  said  that  I  had  an  ''hereditary  weakness" — 
the  allusion  being  to  my  father. 

On  all  questions  we  took  sides  with  Austria  and  Italy 
— about  Albania,  a  Serbian  port  on  the  Adriatic,  Scu- 
tari, and  also  about  the  delimitation  of  the  frontiers  of 
Albania — while  Sir  E.  Grey  hardly  ever  supported  the 
French  or  Russian  claims.  He  mostly  supported  our 
group  in  order  not  to  give  a  pretext  like  the  one  a  dead 
Archduke  was  to  furnish  later  on.  Thus  with  his  as- 
sistance it  was  possible  to  coax  King  Nikita  out  of 
Scutari  again.  Otherwise  this  question  would  already 
have  led  to  a  world-war,  as  we  should  certainly  not  have 
ventured  to  induce  "our  ally"  to  give  way. 

Sir  E.  Grey  conducted  the  negotiations  with  circum- 
spection, calm,  and  tact.  When  a  question  threatened  to 
become  involved,  he  sketched  a  formula  for  agreement 
which  was  to  the  point  and  was  always  accepted.  His 
personality  inspired  equal  confidence  in  all  the  partici- 
pants. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  we  had  again  successfully  emerged 
from  one  of  those  trials  of  strength  which  characterise 
our  policy.  Russia  had  been  obliged  to  give  way  to  us 
on  all  points,  as  she  was  never  in  a  position  to  procure 
success  for  the  Serbian  aims.  Albania  was  established 
as  a  vassal  state  of  Austria  and  Serbia  was  pressed 
back  from  the  sea.  Hence  this  conference  resulted  in  a 
fresh  humiliation  for  Russian  self-esteem.  As  in  1878 
and  in  1908,  we  had  opposed  the  Russian  plans  although 
no  German  interests  were  involved.  Bismarck  was  clever 
enough  to  mitigate  the  mistake  of  the  Congress  by  the 
secret  treaty  and  by  his  attitude  in  the  Battenberg  ques- 
tion; but  we  continued  to  pursue  in  London  the  danger- 
ous path,  upon  which  we  had  once  more  entered  in  the 
Bosnian  question,  nor  did  we  leave  it  in  time  when  it  led 
to  the  precipice. 


12        My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

The  ill-humour  which  prevailed  in  Russia  at  that  time 
was  shown  during  the  conference  by  attacks  in  the  Rus- 
sian Press  against  my  Russian  colleague  and  Russian 
diplomacy.  The  dissatisfied  circles  made  capital  of  his 
German  descent  and  Roman  Catholicism,  his  reputation 
as  a  friend  of  Germany,  and  the  accident  that  he  was 
related  both  to  Count  Mensdorff  and  to  me.  Without 
possessing  a  very  distinguished  personality,  Count  Benck- 
endorff  is  endowed  with  a  number  of  qualifications  that 
distinguish  a  good  diplomat — tact,  polished  manners,  ex- 
perience, courtesy,  and  a  natural  eye  for  men  and  mat- 
ters. He  was  always  at  pains  to  avoid  a  brusque  attitude, 
and  was  supported  in  this  by  England  and  France. 

Later  I  once  remarked  to  him:  "I  presume  that  Rus- 
sian feeling  is  very  anti-German."  He  replied:  "There 
are  also  very  strong  and  influential  pro-German  circles, 
but  in  general  people  are  anti-Austrian." 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  our  "Austrophilie  a 
outrance"  (friendship  for  Austria  through  thick  and 
thin)  was  hardly  calculated  to  loosen  the  Entente  and  to 
direct  Russia  towards  her  Asiatic  interests ! 

The  Balkan  Conference 

At  the  same  time  the  Balkan  Conference  was  sitting 
in  London  and  I  had  occasion  to  come  into  contact  with 
the  leaders  of  the  Balkan  States.  M.  Venizelos  was  cer- 
tainly the  most  distinguished  personality.  At  that  time 
he  was  anything  rather  than  anti-German,  and  visited 
me  several  times ;  he  was  especiall}'  fond  of  wearing  the 
ribbon  of  the  Order  of  the  Red  Eagle— he  even  wore  it 
at  the  French  Embassy  His  prepossessing  charm  and 
ways  of  a  man  of  the  world  secured  him  much  sympathy. 
Next  to  him  M.  Danefl,  at  that  time  Bulgarian  Premier 
and  confidant  of  Count  Berchtold,  played  a  great  part. 
He  gave  the  impression  of  a  subtle  and  energetic  man, 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        13 

and  it  is  probably  only  due  to  the  influence  of  his  Vienna 
and  Budapest  friends,  of  whose  homage  he  often  made 
fun,  that  he  was  induced  to  commit  the  folly  of  enter- 
ing upon  the  second  Balkan  War  and  of  refusing  Rus- 
sian arbitration. 

M.  Take  Jonescu  was  also  frequently  in  London  and 
then  visited  me  regularly.  I  knew  him  from  the  time 
when  I  was  Secretary  at  Bucharest.  He  was  also  one 
of  Herr  von  Kiderlen's  friends.  In  London  he  was 
endeavouring  to  obtain  concessions  to  Rumania  from 
M.  Daneff  by  means  of  negotiations,  in  which  he  was 
assisted  by  the  very  able  Rumanian  Ambassador  Misu. 
It  is  known  that  Bulgarian  opposition  brought  about 
the  failure  of  these  negotiations.  Count  Berchtold  (and 
we  of  course  with  him)  was  entirely  on  Bulgaria's  side, 
otherwise  by  putting  pressure  on  M.  Daneff  we  might 
have  secured  the  desired  satisfaction  for  Rumania  and 
placed  her  under  an  obligation  to  us;  she  was  jfinally 
estranged  from  the  Central  Powers  by  Austria's  atti- 
tude during  and  after  the  second  Balkan  War. 

The  Second  Balkan  War 

The  defeat  of  Bulgaria  in  the  second  Balkan  War 
and  the  victory  of  Serbia,  with  the  Rumanian  inva- 
sion, naturally  constituted  a  humiliation  for  Austria.  The 
plan  to  rectify  this  by  an  expedition  against  Serbia 
seems  to  have  been  evolved  in  Vienna  soon  after.  The 
Italian  revelations  prove  this,  and  it  may  be  assumed 
that  Marquis  San  Giuliano,  who  described  the  plan — most 
aptly — as  a  pericolosissima  aventiira,  saved  us  from  being 
involved  in  a  world-war  as  early  as  the  summer  of  1913. 

Owing  to  the  intimacy  of  Russo-Italian  relations,  the 
Vienna  plan  was  doubtless  known  in  Petrograd.  In 
any  case,  M.  Sazonow  openly  declared  at  Constanza, 
as  M.  Take  Jonescu  told  me,  that  an  Austrian  attack  on 
Serbia  would  be  a  casus  belli  for  Russia. 


14        My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

When  one  of  my  staff  returned  from  leave  in  Vienna 
in  the  spring  of  1914  he  said  that  Herr  von  Tschirschky 
had  declared  that  there  would  soon  be  war.  As  I,  how- 
ever, was  always  left  in  ignorance  about  important  events 
I  considered  this  pessimism  to  be  unfounded. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  it  would  appear  that,  ever  since 
the  peace  of  Bucharest,  Vienna  was  bent  on  securing 
a  revision  of  the  treaty  by  her  own  effort  and  was 
apparently  only  waiting  for  a  favourable  pretext.  Vi- 
enna statesmen  could,  of  course,  depend  on  our  support. 
They  were  aware  of  that,  as  they  had  been  repeatedly 
accused  of  lack  of  firmness.  In  fact,  Berlin  was  press- 
ing for  a  "rehabilitation  of  Austria." 

LiMAN  Von  Sanders 

When  I  returned  to  London  in  December,  1913,  from 
a  lengthy  leave,  the  Liman  von  Sanders  question  had 
led  to  a  fresh  crisis  in  our  relations  with  Russia.  Sir 
E.  Grey,  not  without  concern,  pointed  out  to  me  the 
excitement  there  was  in  Petrograd  over  it :  "I  have  never 
seen  them  so  excited." 

I  received  instructions  from  Berlin  to  request  the  Min- 
ister to  exert  a  restraining  influence  in  Petrograd,  and 
.:o  assist  us  in  settling  the  dispute.  Sir  Edward  gladly 
did  this,  and  his  intervention  contributed  in  no  small 
degree  to  smooth  the  matter  over.  Aly  good  relations 
with  Sir  Edward  and  his  great  influence  in  Petrograd 
were  repeatedly  made  use  of  in  similar  manner  when  we 
wished  to  attain  anything  there,  as  our  representative 
proved  himself  quite  useless  for  such  a  purpose. 

During  the  fateful  days  of  July,  19 14,  Sir  Edward 
said  to  me:  "When  you  want  to  obtain  anything  in 
Petrograd  you  always  apply  to  me,  but  if  I  appeal  to  you 
for  your  influence  in  Vienna  you  fail  m.e." 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914       15 

The  Colonial  Treaty 

The  good  and  confidential  relations  which  I  had  suc- 
ceeded in  establishing,  not  only  with  society  and  the 
most  influential  people  like  Sir  E.  Grey  and  Mr.  Asquith, 
but  also  with  the  great  public  at  public  dinners,  pro- 
duced a  marked  improvement  in  the  relations  of  the  two 
countries.  Sir  Edward  honestly  tried  to  confirm  this 
rapprochement,  and  his  intentions  were  most  apparent  on 
two  questions — the  Colonial  and  the  Bagdad  Railway 
Treaties. 

In  1898  Count  Hatzfeld  and  Mr.  Balfour  had  signed  a 
secret  agreement  dividing  the  Portuguese  colonies  into 
economic  spheres  of  influence  between  us  and  England. 
As  the  Government  of  Portugal  had  neither  the  power 
nor  the  means  to  open  up  her  extended  possessions  or  to 
administer  them  properly,  she  had  already  thought  of 
selling  them  before  and  thus  relieving  her  financial  bur- 
dens. An  agreement  had  been  come  to  between  us  and 
England  which  defined  the  interests  of  both  parties,  and 
which  was  of  the  greater  value  because  Portugal  is  en- 
tirely dependent  on  England,  as  is  generally  known. 

On  the  face  of  it  this  agreement  was  to  safeguard 
the  integrity  and  independence  of  the  Portuguese  State, 
and  merely  declared  the  intention  of  being  of  financial 
and  economic  assistance  to  the  Portuguese.  Literally, 
therefore,  it  did  not  contravene  the  ancient  Anglo-Por- 
tuguese Alliance  of  the  fifteenth  century,  which  was  last 
renewed  under  Charles  II.  and  gave  a  reciprocal  terri- 
torial guarantee. 

In  spite  of  this,  owing  to  the  endeavours  of  Marquis 
Soveral,  who  was  presumably  aware  of  the  Anglo-Ger- 
man agreement,  a  new  treaty — the  so-called  Treaty  of 
Windsor — was  concluded  between  England  and  Portugal 
in  1899,  confirming  the  old  agreements,  which  had  always 
remained  in  force. 


16       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

The  object  of  negotiations  between  us  and  England, 
which  had  commenced  before  my  arrival,  was  to  amend 
and  improve  our  agreement  of  1898,  as  it  had  proved 
unsatisfactory  on  several  points  as  regards  geographical 
delimitation.  Thanks  to  the  accommodating  attitude  of 
the  British  Government  I  succeeded  in  making  the  new 
agreement  fully  accord  with  our  wishes  and  interests. 
The  whole  of  Angola  up  to  the  20th  degree  of  longitude 
was  assigned  to  us,  so  that  we  stretched  up  to  the  Congo 
State  from  the  south;  we  also  acquired  the  valuable 
islands  of  San  Thome  and  Principe,  which  are  north  of 
the  Equator  and  therefore  really  in  the  French  sphere  of 
influence,  a  fact  which  caused  my  French  colleague  to 
enter  strong  but  unavailing  protests. 

Further,  we  obtained  the  northern  part  of  Mozam- 
bique; the  Licango  formed  the  border. 

The  British  Government  showed  the  greatest  consider- 
ation for  our  interests  and  wishes.  Sir  E.  Grey  in- 
tended to  demonstrate  his  goodwill  towards  us,  but  he 
also  wished  to  assist  our  colonial  development  as  a 
whole,  as  England  hoped  to  divert  the  German  develop- 
ment of  strength  from  the  North  Sea  and  Western 
Europe  to  the  Ocean  and  to  Africa.  "We  don't  want 
to  grudge  Germany  her  colonial  development,"  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Cabinet  said  to  me. 

The  British  Government  originally  intended  to  include 
the  Congo  State  in  the  agreement,  which  would  have 
given  us  the  right  of  pre-emption  and  enabled  us  to 
penetrate  it  economically.  We  refused  this  offer  nomi- 
nally in  view  of  Belgian  susceptibilities.  Perhaps  we 
wished  to  be  economical  of  successes  ?  With  regard  also 
to  the  practical  realisation  of  its  real  though  unexpressed 
intention — the  later  actual  partition  of  the  Portuguese 
colonies — the  treaty  in  its  new  form  showed  marked  im- 
provements and  advantages  as  compared  with  the  old 
one.     Cases  had  been  specified  which  empowered  us  to 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914.        17 

take  steps  to  guard  our  interests  in  the  districts  as- 
signed to  us.  These  were  couched  in  such  a  manner 
that  it  was  really  left  to  us  to  decide  when  "vital"  inter- 
ests arose,  so  that,  with  Portugal  entirely  dependent  on 
England,  it  was  only  necessary  to  cultivate  further  good 
relations  with  England  in  order  to  carry  out  our  joint 
intentions  at  a  later  date  with  English  assent. 

Sir  E.  Grey  showed  the  sincerity  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment's desire  to  respect  our  rights  by  referring  to  us 
Englishmen  who  wished  to  invest  capital  and  asked  for 
the  support  of  the  British  Government  in  the  districts 
assigned  to  us  by  the  new  agreement,  even  before  this 
was  completed  and  signed,  and  by  informing  them  that 
their  enterprise  belonged  to  our  sphere  of  influence. 

The  agreement  was  practically  completed  at  the  time 
of  the  King's  visit  to  Berlin  in  May,  1913.  At  that 
time  a  conference  took  place  in  Berlin  under  the  presi- 
dency of  the  Imperial  Chancellor;  in  this  conference  I 
also  took  part,  and  certain  further  wishes  of  ours  were 
defined.  On  my  return  to  London  I  succeeded,  with  the 
assistance  of  Councillor  of  Legation  von  Kiihlmann,  who 
was  working  at  the  agreement  with  Mr.  Parker,  in  having 
our  last  proposals  incorporated,  so  that  the  whole  agree- 
ment could  be  paragraphed  by  Sir  E.  Grey  and  by  me 
in  August,  191 3,  before  I  went  on  leave. 

But  now  fresh  difficulties  arose  which  prevented  its 
being  signed,  and  I  did  not  obtain  the  authorisation  to 
conclude  it  till  a  year  later — that  is,  shortly  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.    It  was,  however,  never  signed. 

Sir  E.  Grey  was  only  willing  to  sign  if  the  agreement 
were  published  together  with  those  of  1898  and  1899. 
England  had,  as  he  said,  no  other  secret  treaties  besides 
these,  and  it  was  contrary  to  established  principles  to 
keep  binding  agreements  secret.  Therefore  he  could  not 
make  any  agreement  without  publishing  it.  He  was, 
however,  willing  to  accede  to  our  wishes  with  regard  to 


18       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

the  time  and  manner  of  publication,  provided  that  such 
publication  took  place  within  one  year  from  the  date  of 
signature. 

At  our  Foreign  Office,  where  my  London  successes  had 
caused  increasing  dissatisfaction,  and  where  an  influen- 
tial personage,  who  acted  the  part  of  Herr  von  Holstein, 
wanted  the  London  post  for  himself,  I  was  informed  that 
the  publication  would  endanger  our  interests  in  the  colo- 
nies, as  the  Portuguese  would  then  not  give  us  any  more 
concessions. 

The  futility  of  this  objection  is  apparent  from  the  con- 
sideration that  the  Portuguese,  in  view  of  the  closeness 
of  Anglo-Portuguese  relations,  were  most  probably  just 
as  well  aware  of  the  old  agreement  as  of  our  new  ar- 
rangements, and  that  the  influence  which  England  pos- 
sesses at  Lisbon  renders  their  Government  completely  im- 
potent in  face  of  an  Anglo-German  agreement. 

Another  pretext  had  therefore  to  be  found  for  wreck- 
ing the  treaty.  It  was  suggested  that  the  publication  of 
the  Treaty  of  Windsor,  which  had  been  concluded  during 
the  time  of  Prince  Hohenlohe — though  it  was  only  a 
renewal  of  the  Treaty  of  Charles  IL,  which  had  always 
remained  in  force — might  endanger  the  position  of  Herr 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  as  a  proof  of  British  hypocrisy 
and  perfidy! 

I  pointed  out  that  the  preamble  of  our  agreement  ex- 
pressed the  same  thing  as  the  Treaty  of  Windsor  and  as 
other  similar  treaties,  namely,  that  we  would  protect  the 
sovereign  rights  of  Portugal  and  the  inviolability  of  its 
possessions.  In  vain!  In  spite  of  repeated  discussions 
with  Sir  E.  Grey,  at  which  he  made  many  fresh  sug- 
gestions for  the  publication,  the  Foreign  Office  persisted 
in  its  attitude,  and  finally  arranged  with  Sir  E.  Goschen 
that  matters  should  be  left  as  they  were! 

The  treaty,  which  offered  us  extraordinary  advantages, 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        19 

the  result  of  more  than  a  year's  work,  was  thus  dropped 
because  it  would  have  been  a  public  success  for  me. 

When  I  mentioned  the  subject  to  Mr.  Harcourt  at  a 
dinner  at  the  Embassy  in  the  spring  of  1914,  the  Minister 
for  the  Colonies  told  me  that  he  was  placed  in  a  difficult 
position,  and  did  not  know  how  to  act.  The  present 
position  was  intolerable — he  wished  to  safeguard  our  in- 
terests, but  was  in  doubt  whether  he  should  proceed  on 
the  terms  of  the  old  or  the  new  treaty.  It  was  therefore 
urgently  desirable  to  clear  up  the  situation  and  to  settle 
the  matter,  which  had  dragged  on  for  such  a  long  time. 

In  reply  to  a  dispatch  in  this  sense  I  received  instruc- 
tions couched  in  terms  which  showed  more  emotion  than 
civility,  telling  me  to  abstain  from  any  further  interfer- 
ence in  the  matter. 

I  now  regret  that  I  did  not  immediately  travel  to  Berlin 
and  place  my  post  at  the  disposal  of  the  monarch,  and 
that  I  had  not  lost  faith  in  the  possibility  of  arriving  at 
an  understanding  with  those  in  authority,  a  sinister  mis- 
take which  was  to  take  its  revenge  a  few  months  later 
in  such  a  tragical  way. 

However  little  I  even  then  enjoyed  the  goodwill  of  the 
highest  official  of  the  Empire,  as  he  feared  that  I  was 
aspiring  to  his  post,  yet  I  must  in  justice  to  him  say 
tliat  during  our  last  interview  before  the  outbreak  of 
war,  at  the  end  of  June,  1914,  to  which  I  will  refer  later, 
he  gave  me  his  assent  for  the  signature  and  publication 
of  the  treaty.  In  spite  of  this  it  required  repeated  ap- 
plications on  my  part,  which  were  supported  by  Herr 
Dr.  Solf  in  Berlin,  before  sanction  was  finally  obtained 
at  the  end  of  July,  1914.  As  the  Serbian  crisis  at  that 
time  already  imperilled  the  peace  of  Europe,  the  comple- 
tion of  the  treaty  had  to  be  postponed.  It  also  is  one 
of  the  sacrifices  of  this  war. 


20       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

The  Bagdad  Treaty 

At  the  same  time  I  was  negotiating  In  London,  with 
the  able  support  of  Herr  von  Kiihlmann,  about  the  so- 
called  Bagdad  Treaty.  The  real  object  of  this  was  to 
divide  up  Asia  Minor  into  spheres  of  influence,  although 
this  term  was  anxiously  avoided  in  view  of  the  rights 
of  the  Sultan.  Sir  E.  Grey  also  repeatedly  stated  that 
there  were  in  existence  no  agreements  with  France  and 
Russia  about  the  partition  of  Asia  Minor. 

In  consultation  with  a  Turkish  representative,  Hakki 
Pasha,  all  economic  questions  concerning  German  under- 
takings were  settled  in  the  main  according  to  the  wishes 
of  the  Deutsche  Bank.  The  most  important  concession 
Sir  E.  Grey  made  to  me  personally  was  the  continuation 
of  the  railway  as  far  as  Basra.  We  had  dropped  this 
point  in  favour  of  the  connection  to  Alexandretta ;  up  to 
that  time  Bagdad  had  been  the  terminal  point  of  the 
railway.  An  international  commission  was  to  regulate 
navigation  on  the  Shatt-el-Arab.  We  were  also  to  have 
a  share  in  the  harbour  works  at  Basra,  and  received 
rights  for  the  navigation  of  the  Tigris,  which  hitherto 
had  been  a  monopoly  of  the  firm  of  Lynch. 

By  this  treaty  the  whole  of  Mesopotamia  as  far  as 
Basra  was  included  within  our  sphere  of  influence  (with- 
out prejudice  to  already  existing  British  navigation  rights 
on  the  Tigris  and  the  rights  of  the  Wilcox  irrigation 
works),  as  well  as  the  whole  district  of  the  Bagdad  and 
Anatolian  railway. 

The  coast  of  the  Persian  Gulf  and  the  Smyrna-Aidin 
railway  were  recognised  as  the  British  economic  sphere, 
Syria  as  the  French,  and  Armenia  as  the  Russian.  If 
both  treaties  were  executed  and  published,  an  agree- 
ment with  England  would  be  reached  which  would  pre- 
clude all  doubts  about  the  possibility  of  an  "Anglo-Ger- 
man co-operation." 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914       21 

The  Question  of  the  Navy 

The  Naval  question  was  and  is  the  most  delicate  of 
all.    It  is  not  always  regarded  rightly. 

The  creation  of  a  powerful  fleet  on  the  other  side  of 
the  North  Sea— the  development  of  the  greatest  military 
power  of  the  Continent  into  the  greatest  naval  power  as 
well — was  bound  to  be  felt  in  England  as  at  least  "in- 
convenient." There  can  be  no  doubt  about  this  in  any 
reasonable  view.  In  order  to  maintain  her  advantage 
and  not  to  become  dependent,  in  order  to  secure  the 
rule  over  the  seas  which  is  necessary  for  her  if  she 
is  not  to  starve,  she  was  compelled  to  undertake  arma- 
ments and  expenditure  which  weighed  heavily  on  the  tax- 
payer. England's  international  position  would  be  threat- 
ened, however,  if  our  policy  created  the  belief  that  war- 
like developments  might  ensue — a  state  of  affairs  which 
had  almost  been  reached  during  the  time  of  the  Morocco 
crises  and  the  Bosnian  problem. 

Great  Britain  had  become  reconciled  to  our  fleet  within 
its  then  appointed  limits,  but  it  was  certainly  not  wel- 
come, and  was  one  of  the  causes — though  not  the  only 
cause  and  perhaps  not  the  most  important — of  her  adhe- 
sion to  France  and  Russia;  but  on  account  of  the  fleet 
alone  England  would  not  have  drawn  the  sword  any 
more  than  on  account  of  our  trade,  which  has  been  al- 
leged to  have  produced  jealousy  and  finally  war. 

From  the  very  beginning  I  maintained  that,  notwith- 
standing the  fleet,  it  would  be  possible  to  arrive  at  a 
friendly  understanding  and  rapprochement  if  we  did  not 
introduce  a  new  Navy  Bill  and  our  policy  were  indubi- 
tably pacific.  I  also  avoided  mention  of  the  fleet  and  the 
word  never  passed  between  Sir  E.  Grey  and  me.  On 
one  occasion  Sir  E.  Grey  said  at  a  meeting  of  the  Cabi- 
net, "The  present  German  Ambassador  has  never  men- 
tioned the  fleet  to  me." 


22       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

During  my  tenure  of  office  Mr.  Churchill,  then  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  proposed,  as  is  known,  the  so- 
called  "Naval  holiday"  and  suggested  for  financial  rea- 
sons, and  probably  also  to  meet  the  pacific  wishes  of  his 
party,  a  year's  pause  in  armaments.  Officially  Sir  E. 
Grey  did  not  support  the  proposal;  he  never  men- 
tioned it  to  me,  but  Mr.  Churchill  repeatedly  spoke  to 
me  about  it. 

I  am  convinced  that  his  suggestion  was  honest,  as  pre- 
varication is  altogether  foreign  to  English  nature.  It 
would  have  been  a  great  success  for  Mr.  Churchill  if 
he  could  have  come  before  the  country  with  reductions 
of  expenditure  and  freed  it  from  the  nightmare  of  arma- 
ments that  weighed  on  the  people. 

I  replied  that  for  technical  reasons  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  agree  to  his  plan.  What  was  to  become  of  the 
workmen  who  were  engaged  for  this  purpose,  and  what 
of  the  technical  staff?  Our  Naval  programme  had  been 
decided  on,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  alter  it  in  any 
way.  On  the  other  hand  we  had  no  intention  of  exceed- 
ing it.  But  he  reverted  to  it  again  and  pointed  out  that 
the  sums  used  for  enormous  armaments  might  better 
be  employed  for  other  and  useful  purposes.  I  replied 
that  this  expenditure  too  benefited  our  home  industries. 

Through  interviews  with  Sir  W.  Tyrrell,  Sir  E.  Grey's 
principal  private  secretary,  I  managed  to  have  the  ques- 
tion removed  from  the  agenda  without  causing  any  ill- 
feeling,  although  it  was  again  referred  to  in  Parliament, 
and  to  prevent  any  official  proposal  being  made.  It  was, 
however,  a  pet  idea  of  Mr.  Churchill's  and  the  Govern- 
ment's, and  I  think  that  by  entering  upon  his  plan  and 
the  formula  i6:io  for  battleships  we  might  have  given 
tangible  proof  of  our  goodwill,  and  strengthened  and 
encouraged  the  tendency  (which  already  prevailed  in  the 
Government)  to  enter  into  closer  relations  with  us. 

But,  as  I  have  said,  it  was  possible  to  arrive  at  an  un- 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914       23 

derstanding  in  spite  of  the  fleet  and  without  a  "Naval 
holiday."  I  had  always  regarded  my  mission  from  this 
point  of  view,  and  I  had  also  succeeded  in  realising  my 
plans  when  the  outbreak  of  war  destroyed  everything  I 
had  achieved. 

Commercial  Jealousy 

The  "commercial  jealousy,"  about  which  we  hear  so 
much,  is  based  on  a  wrong  conception  of  the  circum- 
stances. Certainly  Germany's  rise  as  a  commercial  power 
after  the  war  of  1870  and  during  the  following  decades 
was  a  menace  to  British  commercial  circles  which,  with 
their  industries  and  export-houses,  had  held  a  virtual 
monopoly  of  trade.  The  increasing  commerce  with  Ger- 
many, which  was  the  leading  country  in  Europe  as  re- 
gards British  exports — a  fact  to  which  I  invariably  re- 
ferred in  my  public  speeches — had,  however,  given  rise 
to  the  wish  to  maintain  friendly  relations  with  their 
best  customer  and  business  friend,  and  had  driven  all 
other  considerations  into  the  background. 

The  Briton  is  matter-of-fact — he  takes  things  as  they 
are  and  does  not  tilt  against  windmills.  Notably  in  com- 
mercial circles  I  encountered  the  most  friendly  spirit 
and  the  endeavour  to  further  our  common  economic  in- 
terests. As  a  matter  of  fact  nobody  in  them  took  any 
interest  in  the  Russian,  Italian,  Austrian,  or  even  in  the 
French  representative,  in  spite  of  his  striking  personality 
and  his  political  successes.  Only  the  German  and  Ameri- 
can Ambassadors  attracted  public  attention. 

In  order  to  get  into  touch  with  important  commercial 
circles,  I  accepted  invitations  from  the  United  Chambers 
of  Commerce,  and  from  the  London  and  Bradford  Cham- 
ber, and  was  the  guest  of  the  cities  of  Newcastle  and 
Liverpool.    I  was  well  received  everywhere ;  Manchester, 


24       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

Glasgow,  and  Edinburgh  had  also  invited  me,  and  I  in- 
tended to  go  there  later. 

People  who  did  not  understand  British  conditions  and 
did  not  realise  the  importance  of  "public  dinners,"  also 
people  to  whom  my  successes  were  unwelcome,  re- 
proached me  with  having  done  harm  with  my  speeches. 
I  believe  on  the  contrary  that  by  appearing  in  public  and 
emphasising  common  commercial  interests  I  contributed 
in  no  small  measure  to  the  improvement  of  relations, 
quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  it  would  have  been  clumsy 
and  churlish  to  refuse  all  invitations. 

In  all  other  circles  I  also  met  with  the  most  friendly 
reception  and  hearty  co-operation — at  Court,  in  society, 
and  from  the  Government. 

The  Court  and  Society 

The  King,  although  not  a  genius,  is  a  simple  and  well- 
meaning  man  with  sound  common  sense ;  he  demonstrat- 
ed his  goodwill  towards  me  and  was  frankly  desirous  of 
furthering  my  task.  Although  the  British  Constitution 
leaves  only  very  limited  powers  to  the  Crown,  yet  the 
monarch,  in  virtue  of  his  position,  can  exercise  a  con- 
siderable influence  on  opinion  both  in  society  and  in  the 
Government.  The  Crown  is  the  apex  of  the  social  pyra- 
mid; it  sets  the  fashion.  Society,  which  is  principally 
Unionist  (Conservative),  has  always  taken  an  active 
interest  in  politics,  a  habit  which  the  ladies  share.  It  is 
represented  in  the  House  of  Lords,  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  hence  also  in  the  Cabinet.  An  Englishman  , 
either  is  a  member  of  society,  or  he  would  like  to  be 
one.  It  is  his  constant  endeavour  to  be  a  "Gentleman," 
and  even  people  of  undistinguished  origin,  like  Mr.  As- 
quith,  delight  to  mingle  in  society  and  the  company  of  I 
beautiful  and  fashionable  women. 

The  British  gentlemen  of  both  parties  have  the  same 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        25 

education,  go  to  the  same  colleges  and  universities,  have 
the  same  recreations — golf,  cricket,  lawn-tennis,  or  polo. 
All  have  played  cricket  and  football  in  their  youth ;  they 
have  the  same  habits  of  life,  and  spend  the  week-end  in 
the  country.  There  is  no  social  cleavage  between  the 
parties,  but  only  a  political  one;  in  recent  years  it  has 
so  far  developed  into  a  social  cleavage  that  the  politicians 
of  the  two  camps  avoid  social  intercourse  with  one 
another.  Even  on  the  neutral  territory  of  an  Embassy 
one  did  not  venture  to  mingle  the  two  parties,  as  since 
the  Veto  and  Home  Rule  Bills  the  Unionists  have  ostra- 
cised the  Radicals.  When  the  King  and  Queen  dined 
with  us  a  few  months  after  my  arrival.  Lord  London- 
derry left  the  house  after  dinner,  as  he  did  not  wish  to 
remain  together  with  Sir  E.  Grey.  But  it  is  not  a  differ- 
ence of  caste  or  education  as  in  France;  they  are  not 
two  separate  worlds,  but  the  same  world,  and  the  opin- 
ion about  a  foreigner  is  a  common  one,  and  not  without 
influence  on  his  political  position,  whether  Mr.  Asquith 
be  governing  or  Lord  Lansdowne. 

There  has  been  no  difference  of  caste  in  England  since 
the  time  of  the  Stuarts,  and  since  the  Guelphs  and  Whig 
oligarchy,  in  contrast  to  the  Tory  landed  gentry  en- 
couraged the  rise  of  an  urban  middle-class.  It  is  rather 
a  difference  of  political  opinions  about  questions  of  con- 
stitutional law  and  taxation.  Especially  aristocrats  like 
Grey,  Churchill,  Harcourt,  Crewe,  who  joined  the  peo- 
ple's party — the  Radicals — were  most  hated  by  the  Union- 
ist aristocracy;  one  never  met  any  of  these  gentle- 
men at  any  of  the  great  aristocratic  houses,  except  at 
those  of  a  few  party  friends. 

We  were  received  in  London  with  open  arms  and 
both  parties  rivalled  one  another  in  courtesy  towards  us. 
In  view  of  the  close  relationship  between  politics  and 
society  in  England,  it  would  be  wrong  to  undervalue 


26       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

social  relations,  even  when  the  majority  of  the  upper  ten 
thousand  are  in  opposition  to  the  Government. 

There  is  not  the  same  unbridgable  gulf  between  Mr. 
Asquith  and  the  Duke  of  Devonshire  that  there  is  be- 
tween, say,  M.  Briand  and  the  Due  de  Doudeauville. 
Certainly  they  do  not  consort  together  in  times  of  great 
tension;  they  belong  to  two  separate  social  groups,  but 
these  are  parts  of  the  same  society,  though  of  different 
grades,  the  centre  of  which  is  the  Court.  They  have 
common  friends  and  habits  of  life;  mostly  they  have 
known  each  other  from  their  youth  up  and  also  are 
frequently  related  to  one  another  either  by  blood  or 
marriage. 

Phenomena  like  Mr.  Lloyd  George — the  man  of  the 
people,  petty  attorney,  and  self-made  man — are  the  ex- 
ception. Even  Mr.  Burns,  the  Socialist  Labour  leader, 
and  self-educated  man,  sought  contact  with  society.  In 
view  of  the  prevailing  attempt  to  rank  as  a  gentleman, 
whose  unattained  prototype  is  still  the  great  aristocrat, 
the  value  of  the  verdict  of  society  and  its  attitude  must 
not  be  underestimated. 

Hence  the  social  adaptability  of  a  representative  no- 
where plays  a  greater  role  than  in  England.  A  hospitable 
house  with  pleasant  hosts  is  worth  more  than  the  most 
profound  scientific  knowledge;  a  savant  with  provincial 
manners  and  small  means  would  gain  no  influence,  in 
spite  of  all  his  learning. 

The  Briton  loathes  a  bore,  a  schemer,  and  a  prig; 
he  likes  a  good  fellow. 

Sir  Edward  Grey 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  influence  in  all  matters  of  foreign 
policy  was  almost  unlimited.  On  important  occasions  he 
used  indeed  to  say,  'T  must  first  bring  it  before  the  Cab- 
inet" ;  but  this  always  agreed  to  his  views.    His  authority 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        27 

was  undisputed.  Although  he  does  not  know  foreign 
countries  at  all,  and  had  never  left  England  except  for 
a  short  visit  to  Paris,  he  was  fully  conversant  with  all 
the  important  questions  owing  to  his  long  parliamentary 
experience  and  his  natural  insight.  He  understands 
French,  but  does  not  speak  it.  He  was  returned  to 
Parliament  as  a  young  man,  and  soon  began  to  interest 
himself  in  foreign  affairs.  Under  Lord  Rosebery  he 
was  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
became  Secretary  of  State  in  1906,  under  Mr.  Campbell- 
Bannerman;  he  has  now  held  the  post  for  some  ten 
years. 

The  scion  of  an  old  north  country  family,  which  had 
already  furnished  Grey,  the  well-known  statesman,  he 
joined  the  left  wing  of  his  party  and  sympathised  with 
Socialists  and  pacifists.  You  may  call  him  a  Socialist 
in  the  ideal  sense,  as  he  carries  the  theory  into  his 
private  life  and  lives  very  simply  and  unpretentiously, 
although  he  has  extensive  means.  Ostentation  is  foreign 
to  him.  In  London  he  only  had  a  small  house,  and 
never  gave  dinners,  except  the  one  official  dinner  at  the 
Foreign  Office  on  the  King's  Birthday.  On  the  few  oc- 
casions when  he  entertained  guests  it  was  at  a  simple 
dinner  or  lunch  with  maidservants  to  wait.  Also  he 
avoided  large  functions  and  banquets. 

Like  his  colleagues,  he  regularly  spends  his  week-ends 
in  the  country,  but  not  with  large  or  fashionable  parties. 
He  is  mostly  by  himself  in  his  cottage  in  the  New  For- 
est, where  he  takes  long  walks  to  study  birds  and  their 
ways,  as  he  is  a  passionate  lover  of  nature  and  an 
ornithologist.  Or  sometimes  he  goes  to  his  estate  in 
the  north,  where  he  feeds  the  squirrels  that  come  in 
at  the  windows,  and  breeds  different  species  of  water- 
fowl. 

He  was  very  fond  of  going  to  the  Norfolk  marshes 


28       My  Mission  to  London  1912--1914. 

to  watch  in  their  breeding  season  the  rare  kinds  of 
herons,  which  nest  only  there. 

In  his  youth  he  was  a  well-known  cricket  and  racquet 
player;  now  his  favourite  pastime  is  salmon  and  trout- 
fishing  in  Scottish  rivers  in  company  with  his  friend 
Lord  Glenconner,  Mr.  Asquith's  brother-in-law.  "All  the 
rest  of  the  year  I  am  looking  forward  to  it."  He  has 
published  a  book  on  fishing. 

On  one  occasion,  when  we  spent  a  week-end  with  him 
alone  at  Lord  Glenconner's,  near  Salisbury,  he  arrived 
on  a  bicycle  and  returned  to  his  cottage  about  thirty 
miles  distant  in  the  same  way. 

The  simplicity  and  honesty  of  his  ways  secured  him 
the  esteem  even  of  his  opponents,  who  were  to  be  found 
rather  in  the  sphere  of  home  affairs  than  of  foreign 
policy.    Lies  and  intrigue  are  equally  repugnant  to  him. 

His  wife,  to  whom  he  was  devotedly  attached  and 
from  whom  he  was  inseparable,  died  in  consequence  of 
being  thrown  from  a  trap  she  was  driving.  As  is  gen- 
erally known,  one  of  his  brothers  was  killed  by  a  lion. 

Wordsworth  is  his  favourite  poet,  and  he  could  quote 
much  of  his  poetry. 

The  calm  quiet  of  his  British  nature  is  not  lacking  in  a 
sense  of  humour.  Once  when  he  was  lunching  with  us 
and  the  children,  and  heard  them  talking  German,  he 
said,  "I  can't  help  thinking  how  clever  these  children 
are  to  talk  German  so  well,"  and  was  pleased  with  his 
joke. 

This  is  a  true  picture  of  the  man  who  is  decried  as 
"Liar-Grey"  and  instigator  of  the  world-war. 

Mr.  Asquith 

Mr.  Asquith  is  a  man  of  an  entirely  different  stamp. 
A  jovial  bon-vivant,  fond  of  the  ladies,  especially  the 
young  and  pretty  ones,  he  is  partial  to  cheerful  society 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        29 

and  good  cooking ;  and  his  zest  for  enjoyment  is  shared 
by  his  wife.  Formerly  a  well-known  barrister  with  a 
large  income,  and  for  a  number  of  years  in  Parliament, 
then  a  Minister  under  Mr.  Gladstone,  a  pacifist  like  his 
friend  Grey,  and  favouring  an  understanding  with  Ger- 
many, he  treated  all  questions  with  the  cheery  calm 
and  assurance  of  an  experienced  man  of  business,  whose 
good  health  and  excellent  nerves  were  steeled  by  devotion 
to  the  game  of  golf. 

His  daughters  were  at  school  in  Germany  and  spoke 
German  fluently.  In  a  short  time  we  got  on  friendly 
terms  with  him  and  his  family,  and  were  his  guests  in 
his  small  country  house  on  the  Thames. 

Only  on  rare  occasions  did  he  concern  himself  with 
foreign  politics,  when  important  questions  arose ;  then  of 
course  his  decision  was  final.  During  the  critical  days 
of  July  Mrs.  Asquith  repeatedly  came  to  us  to  warn 
us,  and  in  the  end  she  was  quite  distraught  at  the 
tragic  turn  of  events.  Mr.  Asquith  also,  when  I  called 
on  him  on  the  2nd  August  to  make  a  last  effort  in  the 
direction  of  expectant  neutrality,  was  quite  broken, 
though  absolutely  calm.  Tears  were  coursing  down  his 
cheeks. 

NiCOLSON 

Sir  A.  Nicolson  and  Sir  W.  Tyrrell  were  the  two 
most  influential  men  at  the  Foreign  OflSce  after  the  Min- 
ister. The  former  was  no  friend  of  ours,  but  his  at- 
titude towards  me  was  absolutely  correct  and  courteous. 
Our  personal  relations  were  excellent.  He  too  did  not 
want  war;  but  when  we  advanced  against  France,  he 
no  doubt  worked  in  the  direction  of  an  immediate  in- 
tervention. He  was  the  confidant  of  my  French  col- 
league, with  whom  he  was  in  constant  touch;  also  he 
wished  to  relieve  Lord  Bertie  in  Paris. 


30       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914. 

Sir  Arthur,  who  had  been  Ambassador  at  Petrograd, 
had  concluded  the  treaty  of  1907,  which  had  enabled 
Russia  again  to  turn  her  attention  to  the  West  and  to 
the  Near  East. 

Tyrrell 

Sir  W.  Tyrrell,  Sir  Edward's  private  secretary,  pos- 
sessed far  greater  influence  than  the  Permanent  Under- 
Secretary.  This  highly  intelligent  man  had  been  at  school 
in  Germany,  and  had  then  turned  to  diplomacy,  but 
had  only  been  abroad  for  a  short  time.  At  first  he 
favoured  the  anti-German  policy,  which  was  then  in 
fashion  amongst  the  younger  British  diplomatists,  but 
later  he  became  a  convinced  advocate  of  an  under- 
standing. He  influenced  Sir  E.  Grey,  with  whom  he 
was  very  intimate,  in  this  direction.  Since  the  outbreak 
of  war  he  has  left  the  Office  and  found  a  place  in  the 
Home  Office,  probably  because  of  the  criticisms  passed 
on  him  for  his  Germanophil  tendency. 


Attitude  of  the  German  Foreign  Office 

Nothing  can  describe  the  rage  of  certain  gentlemen  at 
my  London  successes  and  the  position  which  I  had  man- 
aged to  make  for  myself  in  a  short  time.  They  devised 
vexatious  instructions  to  render  my  office  more  difficult. 
I  was  left  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  most  impor- 
tant matters,  and  was  restricted  to  the  communication 
of  dull  and  unimportant  reports.  Secret  agents'  reports, 
on  matters  about  which  I  could  not  learn  without  espion- 
age and  the  necessary  funds,  were  never  available  to 
me;  and  it  was  not  till  the  last  days  of  July,  1914,  that 
I  learnt,  quite  by  chance,  from  the  Naval  Attache  of  the 
secret  Anglo-French  agreement  concerning  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  two  fleets  in  case  of  war.     The  knowledge 


\ 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        31 

of  other  important  events  which  had  been  known  to  the 
Office  for  a  long  time,  like  the  correspondence  between 
Grey  and  Cambon,  was  kept  from  me. 


In  Case  of  War 

Soon  after  my  arrival  I  obtained  the  conviction  that 
under  no  circumstances  had  we  to  fear  a  British  attack 
or  British  support  for  any  foreign  attack,  but  that 
under  any  circumstances  England  would  protect  the 
French.  I  expressed  this  view  in  repeated  dispatches, 
with  minute  proof  and  great  emphasis,  but  did  not  obtain 
any  credence,  although  Lord  Haldane's  refusal  to  assent 
to  the  neutrality  formula  and  England's  attitude  during 
the  Morocco  crisis  had  been  pretty  obvious  indications. 
In  addition  there  were  the  secret  agreements  which  I  have 
referred  to,  and  which  were  known  to  the  Office. 

I  always  pointed  out  that  in  the  event  of  a  war  be- 
tween European  Powers,  England  as  a  commercial  state 
would  suffer  enormously,  and  would  therefore  do  her 
best  to  prevent  a  conflict;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  she 
would  never  tolerate  a  weakening  or  annihilation  of 
France ;  because  of  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  Eu- 
ropean balance  of  power  and  of  preventing  a  German 
superiority  of  force.  Lord  Haldane  had  told  me  this 
shortly  after  my  arrival,  and  all  the  leading  people  had 
expressed  themselves  in  the  same  sense. 

The  Serbian  Crisis 

At  the  end  of  June  I  went  to  Kiel  by  command  of 
the  Emperor.  A  few  weeks  prior  to  this  I  had  been 
made  an  honorary  D.C.L.  of  Oxford,  an  honour  which 
had  not  been  conferred  on  any  German  Ambassador 
since  Herr  von  Bunsen.  On  board  the  Meteor  we  learned 
of  the  death  of  the  Archduke.    H.M.  regretted  that  his 


32       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

efforts  to  win  him  over  to  his  way  of  thinking  had  thus 
been  rendered  vain.  I  do  not  know  whether  the  plan 
of  an  active  poHcy  against  Serbia  had  already  been  de- 
cided on  at  Konopischt. 

As  I  was  not  instructed  about  views  and  events  in 
Vienna,  I  did  not  attach  very  great  importance  to  this 
occurrence.  Later  on  I  could  only  remark  that  amongst 
Austrian  aristocrats  a  feeling  of  relief  outweighed  other 
sentiments.  On  board  the  Meteor  there  was  also  an  Aus- 
trian guest  of  the  Emperor's,  Count  Felix  Thun.  He 
had  remained  in  his  cabin  all  the  time  suffering  from  sea- 
sickness, in  spite  of  the  splendid  weather ;  but  on  receiv- 
ing the  news  he  was  well.  The  fright  or  joy  had  cured 
him. 

On  my  arrival  in  Berlin  I  saw  the  Chancellor  and  told 
him  that  I  considered  the  state  of  our  foreign  relations 
very  satisfactory,  as  we  were  on  better  terms  with  Eng- 
land than  we  had  been  for  a  long  time,  whilst  in 
France  also  the  government  was  in  the  hands  of  a  pacifist 
Ministry. 

Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  did  not  appear  to  share 
my  optimism,  and  complained  about  Russian  armaments. 
I  sought  to  reassure  him,  emphasising  the  fact  that  Rus- 
sia had  no  interest  in  attacking  us,  and  that  such  an 
attack  would  never  receive  Anglo-French  support,  as 
both  countries  wanted  peace.  Thereupon  I  went  to  Dr. 
Zimmermann,  who  was  acting  for  Herr  von  Jagow,  and 
he  told  me  that  Russia  was  about  to  raise  900,000  addi- 
tional troops.  His  language  betrayed  unmistakable  an- 
noyance with  Russia,  which  was  "everywhere  in  our 
way."  There  were  also  difficulties  in  economic  policy. 
Of  course,  I  was  not  told  that  General  von  Moltke  was 
pressing  for  war ;  but  I  learned  that  Herr  von  Tschirsch- 
ky  had  been  reprimanded  because  he  reported  that  he 
had  counselled  moderation  towards  Serbia  in  Vienna. 

On  my  return  from  Silesia  to  London  I  stopped  only 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        33 

a  few  hours  in  Berlin,  where  I  heard  that  Austria  in- 
tended to  take  steps  against  Serbia  in  order  to  put  an 
end  to  an  impossible  situation. 

I  regret  that  at  the  moment  I  underestimated  the  im- 
portance of  the  news.  I  thought  that  nothing  would 
come  of  it  this  time  either,  and  that  matters  could  easily 
be  settled,  even  if  Russia  became  threatening.  I  now 
regret  that  I  did  not  stay  in  Berlin  and  at  once  declare 
that  I  would  not  co-operate  in  a  policy  of  this  kind. 

Subsequently  I  ascertained  that,  at  the  decisive  con- 
ference at  Potsdam  on  the  5th  July,  the  Vienna  enquiry 
received  the  unqualified  assent  of  all  the  leading  people, 
and  with  the  rider  that  no  harm  would  be  done  if  a 
war  with  Russia  should  result.  Thus  it  was  expressed, 
at  any  rate,  in  the  Austrian  protocol  which  Count  Mens- 
dorff  received  in  London.  Soon  afterwards  Herr  von 
Jagow  was  in  Vienna  to  consult  Count  Berchtold  about 
all  these  matters. 

At  that  time  I  received  instructions  to  induce  the  Brit- 
ish Press  to  adopt  a  friendly  attitude  should  Austria 
administer  the  coup  de  grace  to  the  "Great  Serbia"  move- 
ment, and  to  exert  my  personal  influence  to  prevent  pub- 
lic opinion  from  becoming  inimical  to  Austria.  If  one 
remembered  England's  attitude  during  the  annexation 
crisis,  when  public  opinion  showed  sympathy  for  the 
Serbian  rights  in  Bosnia,  as  well  as  her  benevolent  fur- 
therance of  national  movements  in  the  days  of  Lord 
Byron  and  Garibaldi,  the  probability  that  she  would 
support  the  intended  punitive  expedition  against  the  mur- 
derers of  the  prince  happened  so  remote,  that  I  found 
myself  obliged  to  give  an  urgent  warning.  But  I  also 
warned  them  against  the  whole  plan,  which  I  character- 
ised as  adventurous  and  dangerous,  and  advised  them  to 
counsel  the  Austrians  to  moderation,  as  I  did  not  believe 
that  the  conflict  could  be  localised. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  to  me  that  Russia  was  not 


34       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

ready ;  there  would  probably  be  some  fuss,  but  the  more 
firmly  we  took  sides  with  Austria  the  more  would  Russia 
give  way.  As  it  was,  Austria  was  accusing  us  of  weak- 
ness and  therefore  we  dare  not  leave  her  in  the  lurch. 
Public  opinion  in  Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  was  becom- 
ing more  and  more  anti-German,  so  we  must  just 
risk  it. 

In  view  of  this  attitude,  which,  as  I  found  later,  was 
based  on  reports  from  Count  Pourtales  that  Russia  would 
not  move  under  any  circumstances,  and  which  caused  us 
to  spur  Count  Berchtold  on  to  the  utmost  energy,  I 
hoped  for  salvation  through  British  mediation,  as  I  knew 
that  Sir  E.  Grey's  great  influence  in  Petrograd  could 
be  used  in  the  direction  of  peace.  I  therefore  availed 
myself  of  my  friendly  relations  with  the  Minister  to  re- 
quest him  in  confidence  to  advise  moderation  in  Russia 
in  case  Austria,  as  seemed  likely,  demanded  satisfaction 
from  Serbia. 

At  first  the  English  Press  preserved  calm  and  was 
friendly  to  Austria,  because  the  murder  was  generally 
condemned.  But  gradually  more  and  more  voices  were 
heard  insisting  emphatically  that,  however  much  the 
crime  merited  punishment,  its  exploitation  for  political 
purposes  could  not  be  justified.  Austria  was  strongly 
exhorted  to  use  moderation. 

When  the  ultimatum  was  published,  all  the  papers 
with  the  exception  of  the  Standard — the  ever-necessitous, 
which  had  apparently  been  bought  by  Austria — were 
unanimous  in  condemnation.  The  whole  world,  except- 
ing Berlin  and  Vienna,  realised  that  it  meant  war — in- 
deed, "the  world-war."  The  British  Fleet,  which  hap- 
pened to  have  assembled  for  a  naval  review,  was  not 
demobilised. 

My  efforts  were  in  the  first  place  directed  towards 
obtaining  as  conciliatory  a  reply  from  Serbia  as  was 
possible,  since  the  attitude  of  the  Russian  Government 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914       35 

left  room  for  no  doubts  about  the  gravity  of  the  situa- 
tion. 

Serbia  responded  favourably  to  the  British  efforts,  as 
M.  Pasitch  had  really  agreed  to  everything,  excepting 
two  points,  about  which,  however,  he  declared  his  will- 
ingness to  negotiate.  If  Russia  and  England  had  wanted 
the  war,  in  order  to  attack  us,  a  hint  to  Belgrade  would 
have  been  enough,  and  the  unprecedented  Note  would 
not  have  been  answered. 

Sir  E.  Grey  went  through  the  Serbian  reply  with  me, 
and  pointed  out  the  conciliatory  attitude  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Belgrade.  Thereupon  we  discussed  his  pro- 
posal of  mediation,  which  was  to  include  a  formula  ac- 
ceptable to  both  pprties  for  clearing  up  the  two  points. 
His  proposal  was  that  a  committee,  consisting  of  M. 
Cambon,  the  Marquis  Imperiali,  and  myself,  should  as- 
semble under  his  presidency,  and  it  would  have  been  an 
easy  matter  for  us  to  find  an  acceptable  formula  for  the 
points  at  issue,  which  mainly  concerned  the  collaboration 
of  Austrian  Imperial  officials  at  the  investigations  in 
Belgrade.  Given  goodwill,  everything  could  have  been 
settled  at  one  or  two  sittings,  and  the  mere  acceptance 
of  the  British  proposal  would  have  brought  about  a 
relaxation  of  the  tension,  and  would  have  further  im- 
proved our  relations  with  England.  I  therefore  strongly 
backed  the  proposal,  on  the  ground  that  otherwise  there 
was  danger  of  the  world-war,  through  which  we  stood 
to  gain  nothing  and  lose  all ;  but  in  vain.  It  was  deroga- 
tory to  the  dignity  of  Austria — we  did  not  intend  to 
interfere  in  Serbian  matters — we  left  these  to  our  ally. 
I  was  to  work  for  "the  localisation  of  the  conflict." 

Needless  to  say  a  mere  hint  from  Berlin  would  have 
decided  Count  Berchtold  to  content  himself  with  a 
diplomatic  success,  and  to  accept  the  Serbian  reply.  This 
hint  was  not  given ;  on  the  contrary  they  urged  in  the 


36        My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

direction  of  war.  It  would  have  been  such  a  splendid 
success. 

After  our  refusal  Sir  Edward  requested  us  to  submit 
a  proposal.  We  insisted  on  war.  I  could  not  obtain  any 
reply  but  that  Austria  had  shown  an  exceedingly  "ac- 
commodating spirit"  by  not  demanding  an  extension  of 
territory. 

Sir  Edward  rightly  pointed  out  that  even  without  an 
extension  of  territory  it  is  possible  to  reduce  a  state  to 
a  condition  of  vassalage,  and  that  Russia  would  see  a 
humiliation  in  this,  and  would  not  suffer  it. 

The  impression  grew  stronger  and  stronger  that  we 
wanted  war  under  any  circumstances.  It  was  impossible 
to  interpret  our  attitude,  on  a  question  which  did  not 
directly  concern  us,  in  any  other  way.  The  urgent  re- 
quests and  definite  assurances  of  M.  Sazonow,  followed 
by  the  Czar's  positively  humble  telegrams,  the  repeated 
proposals  of  Sir  E.  Grey,  the  warnings  of  the  Marquis 
San  Giuliano  and  Signor  Bollati,  my  urgent  counsels,  all 
were  of  no  avail.  Berlin  persisted ;  Serbia  must  be  mas- 
sacred. 

The  more  I  pressed  the  less  were  they  inclined  to  come 
round,  if  only  that  I  might  not  have  the  success  of 
averting  war  in  conjunction  with  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Finally,  on  the  29th,  the  latter  decided  on  the  famous 
warning.  I  replied  that  I  had  invariably  reported  that 
we  should  have  to  reckon  with  English  opposition  if  it 
came  to  a  war  with  France.  Repeatedly  the  Minister 
said  to  me:  "If  war  breaks  out,  it  will  be  the  greatest 
catastrophe  the  world  has  ever  seen." 

After  that,  events  followed  each  other  rapidly.  When 
at  last  Count  Berchtold,  who  up  till  then  had,  at  the 
behest  of  Berlin,  played  the  strong  man,  decided  to  come 
round,  we  replied  to  the  Russian  mobilisation,  after 
Russia  had  negotiated  and  waited  for  a  whole  week  in 
vain,  with  the  ultimatum  and  the  declaration  of  war. 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914       37 

The  English  Declaration  of  War 

Sir  Edward  was  still  looking  for  new  ways  of  avoiding 
the  catastrophe.  Sir  W.  Tyrrell  called  on  me  on  the 
morning  of  the  ist  August  to  tell  me  that  his  chief  still 
hoped  to  find  a  way  out.  Would  we  remain  neutral  if 
France  did?  I  understood  that  we  should  then  agree  to 
spare  France,  but  he  had  meant  that  we  should  remain 
altogether  neutral — towards  Russia  also.  That  was  the 
well-known  "misunderstanding."  Sir  Edward  had  asked 
me  to  call  in  the  afternoon.  As  he  was  at  a  meeting  of 
the  Cabinet,  he  called  me  up  on  the  telephone,  Sir  W. 
Tyrrell  having  hurried  to  him  at  once.  In  the  afternoon, 
however,  he  talked  only  about  Belgian  neutrality  and 
the  possibility  that  we  and  France  might  face  one  another 
in  arms  without  attacking. 

Thus  this  was  not  a  proposal  at  all,  but  a  question 
without  any  guarantee,  as  our  interview,  which  I  have 
mentioned  before,  was  to  take  place  soon  afterwards. 
Berlin,  however,  without  waiting  for  the  interview,  made 
this  report  the  foundation  for  far-reaching  measures. 
Then  there  came  M.  Poincare's  letter,  Bonar  Law's  let- 
ter, King  Albert's  telegram.  The  waverers  in  the  Cabi- 
net— excepting  three  members  who  resigned — were  con- 
verted. 

Till  the  very  last  moment  I  had  hoped  that  England 
would  adopt  a  waiting  attitude.  Nor  did  my  French  col- 
league feel  at  all  confident,  as  I  heard  from  a  private 
source.  Even  on  the  ist  August  the  King  had  given 
the  President  an  evasive  reply.  But  England  was  already 
mentioned  as  an  opponent  in  the  telegram  from  Berlin 
announcing  the  imminent  danger  of  war.  Berlin  was 
therefore  already  reckoning  on  war  with  England. 

Before  my  departure  Sir  E.  Grey  received  me,  on  the 
5th,  at  his  house.  I  had  called  at  his  request.  He  was 
deeply  moved.    He  told  me  he  would  always  be  prepared 


'M)7 


O/ 


38       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

to  mediate.  "We  don't  want  to  crush  Germany."  Un- 
fortunately this  confidential  interview  was  made  public, 
and  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  thus  destroyed  the  last 
chance  of  gaining  peace  through  England. 

The  arrangements  for  our  departure  were  perfectly 
dignified  and  calm.  The  King  had  previously  sent  his 
equerry,  Sir  E.  Ponsonby,  to  express  his  regrets  at  my 
departure  and  that  he  could  not  see  me  himself.  Princess 
Louise  wrote  to  me  that  the  whole  family  were  sorry  we 
were  leaving.  Mrs.  Asquith  and  other  friends  came  to 
the  Embassy  to  take  leave. 

A  special  train  took  us  to  Harwich,  where  a  guard  of 
honour  was  drawn  up  for  me.  I  was  treated  like  a  de- 
parting Sovereign.  Such  was  the  end  of  my  London  mis- 
sion. It  was  wrecked,  not  by  the  wiles  of  the  British, 
but  by  the  wiles  of  our  policy. 

Count  Mensdorff  and  his  staff  had  come  to  the  station 
in  London.  He  was  cheerful,  and  gave  me  to  understand 
that  perhaps  he  would  remain  there,  but  he  told  the 
English  that  we,  and  not  Austria,  had  wanted  the  war. 

Retrospect 

Looking  back  after  two  years,  I  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  I  realised  too  late  that  there  was  no  room  for  me  in 
a  system  that  for  years  had  lived  on  routine  and  tradi- 
tions alone,  and  that  only  tolerated  representatives  who 
reported  what  their  superiors  wished  to  read.  Absence 
of  prejudice  and  an  independent  judgment  are  resented. 
Lack  of  ability  and  want  of  character  are  praised  and 
esteemed,  while  successes  meet  with  disfavour  and  excite 
alarm. 

I  had  given  up  my  opposition  to  the  insane  Triple  Alli- 
ance policy,  as  I  realised  that  it  was  useless,  and  that 
my  warnings  were  attributed  to  "Austrophobia,"  to  my 
idee  fixe.    In  politics,  which  are  neither  acrobatics  nor  a 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914       39 

game,  but  the  main  business  of  the  firm,  there  is  no  "phil" 
or  "phobe,"  but  only  the  interest  of  the  community.  A 
policy,  however,  that  is  based  only  on  Austrians,  Magyars, 
and  Turks  must  come  into  conflict  with  Russia,  and 
finally  lead  to  a  catastrophe. 

In  spite  of  former  mistakes,  all  might  still  have  been 
put  right  in  July,  19 14.  An  agreement  with  England 
had  been  arrived  at.  We  ought  to  have  sent  a  repre- 
sentative to  Petrograd  who  was  at  least  of  average  politi- 
cal capacity,  and  to  have  convinced  Russia  that  we 
wished  neither  to  control  the  straits  nor  to  strangle  Ser- 
bia. "Laches  I'Aittriche  et  nous  Idcherons  les  Franj;ais" 
("Drop  Austria  and  we  will  drop  the  French"),  M. 
Sazonow  said  to  us.  And  M.  Cambon  told  Herr  von 
Jagow,  "Vous  n'avez  pas  besoin  de  suivre  I'Autriche  par- 
tout"  ("You  need  not  follow  Austria  everywhere"). 

We  wanted  neither  wars  nor  alliances;  we  wanted  only 
treaties  that  would  safeguard  us  and  others,  and  secure 
our  economic  development,  which  was  without  its  like  in 
history.  If  Russia  had  been  freed  in  the  West,  she  could 
again  turn  to  the  East,  and  the  Anglo-Russian  rivalry 
would  have  been  re-established  automatically  and  without 
our  intervention,  and  not  less  certainly  also  the  Russo- 
Japanese. 

We  could  also  have  considered  the  question  of  the 
reduction  of  armaments,  and  need  no  longer  have  trou- 
bled ourselves  about  Austrian  complications.  Then  Aus- 
tria would  have  become  the  vassal  of  the  German  Empire, 
without  any  alliance — and  especially  without  our  seeking 
her  good  graces,  a  proceeding  ultimately  leading  to  war 
for  the  liberation  of  Poland  and  the  destruction  of  Serbia, 
although  German  interest  demanded  the  exact  contrary. 

I  had  to  support  in  London  a  policy  the  heresy  of 
which  I  recognised.  That  brought  down  vengeance  on 
me,  because  it  was  a  sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost. 


40       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

My  Return 

As  soon  as  I  arrived  in  Berlin  I  saw  that  I  was  to  be 
made  the  scapegoat  for  the  catastrophe  for  which  our 
Government  had  made  itself  responsible  against  my  ad- 
vice and  warnings. 

The  report  was  deliberately  circulated  in  official  quar- 
ters that  I  had  allowed  myself  to  be  deceived  by  Sir  E. 
Grey,  because,  if  he  had  not  wanted  war,  Russia  would 
not  have  mobilised.  Count  Pourtales,  whose  reports 
could  be  relied  on,  was  to  be  protected,  not  least  on  ac- 
count of  his  relationship.  He  had  conducted  himself 
"magnificently,"  he  was  praised  enthusiastically,  and  I 
was  blamed  the  more  severely. 

"What  does  Serbia  matter  to  Russia?"  this  statesman 
said  to  me  after  eight  years  in  office  at  Petrograd.  The 
whole  thing  was  a  British  trick  that  I  had  not  noticed. 
At  the  Foreign  Office  they  told  me  that  war  would  in 
any  case  have  come  in  1916.  Then  Russia  would  have 
been  ready;  therefore  it  was  better  now. 

The  Question  of  Responsibility 

As  is  evident  from  all  official  publications — and  this  is 
not  refuted  by  our  White  Book,  which,  owing  to  the  pov- 
erty of  its  contents  and  to  its  omissions,  is  a  gravely  self- 
accusing  document — 

1.  We  encouraged  Count  Berchtold  to  attack  Serbia, 
although  German  interests  were  not  involved  and  the 
danger  of  a  world-war  must  have  been  known  to  us. 
Whether  we  were  aware  of  the  wording  of  the  Ultima- 
tum is  completely  immaterial. 

2.  During  the  time  between  the  23rd  and  30th  July, 
1914,  when  M.  Sazonow  emphatically  declared  that  he 
would  not  tolerate  any  attack  on  Serbia,  we  rejected  the 
British  proposals  of  mediation,  although  Serbia,  under 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        41 

Russian  and  British  pressure,  had  accepted  almost  the 
whole  of  the  Uhimatum,  and  although  an  agreement 
about  the  two  points  at  issue  could  easily  have  been 
reached,  and  Count  Berchtold  was  even  prepared  to 
content  himself  with  the  Serbian  reply. 

3.  On  the  30th  July,  when  Count  Berchtold  wanted 
to  come  to  terms,  we  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Petrograd 
merely  because  of  the  Russian  mobilisation,  although 
Austria  had  not  been  attacked;  and  on  the  31st  July 
we  declared  war  on  Russia,  although  the  Czar  pledged 
his  word  that  he  would  not  order  a  man  to  march  as 
long  as  negotiations  were  proceeding — thus  deliberately 
destroying  the  possibility  of  a  peaceful  settlement. 

In  view  of  the  above  undeniable  facts  it  is  no  wonder 
that  the  whole  of  the  civilised  world  outside  Germany 
places  the  entire  responsibility  for  the  world-war  upon 
our  shoulders. 


The  Enemy  Point  of  View 

Is  it  not  intelligible  that  our  enemies  should  declare 
that  they  will  not  rest  before  a  system  is  destroyed  which 
is  a  constant  menace  to  our  neighbours?  Must  they  not 
otherwise  fear  that  in  a  few  years'  time  they  will  again 
have  to  take  up  arms  and  again  see  their  provinces  over- 
run and  their  towns  and  villages  destroyed?  Have  not 
they  proved  to  be  right  who  declared  that  the  spirit  of 
Treitschke  and  Bernhardi  governed  the  German  people, 
that  spirit  which  glorified  war  as  such,  and  did  not  loathe 
it  as  an  evil,  that  with  us  the  feudal  knight  and  Junker, 
the  warrior  caste,  still  rule  and  form  ideals  and  values, 
not  the  civilian  gentleman ;  that  the  love  of  the  duel  which 
animates  our  academic  youth  still  persists  in  those  who 
control  the  destinies  of  the  people  ?  Did  not  the  Zabern 
incident  and  the  parliamentary  discussions  about  it  clear- 
ly demonstrate  to  foreign  countries  the  value  we  place 


42       My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

on  the  rights  and  Hberties  of  the  citizen  if  these  colHde 
with  questions  of   military  power? 

That  intelHgent  historian  Cramb,  who  has  since  died, 
an  admirer  of  Germany,  clothed  the  German  conception 
in  the  words  of  Euphorion : 

Dream  ye   of  peace?* 
Dream  he  that  will — 
War  is  the  rallying  cry! 
Victory  is  the  refrain. 

Militarism,  which  by  rights  is  an  education  for  the 
people  and  an  instrument  of  policy,  turns  policy  into  the 
instrument  of  military  power  when  the  patriarchal  ab- 
solutism of  the  soldier-kingdom  makes  possible  an  atti- 
tude which  a  democracy,  remote  from  military  Junker 
influence,  would  never  have  permitted. 

So  think  our  enemies,  and  so  they  must  think  when 
they  see  that,  in  spite  of  capitalistic  industrialisation  and 
in  spite  of  socialist  organisation,  "the  living  are  still 
ruled  by  the  dead,"  as  Friedrich  Nietzsche  says.  The 
principal  war  aim  of  our  enemies,  the  democratisation 
of  Germany,  will  be  realised! 

Bismarck 

Bismarck,  like  Napoleon,  loved  conflict  for  itself.  As 
a  statesman  he  avoided  fresh  wars,  the  folly  of  which 
he  recognised.  He  was  content  with  bloodless  battles. 
After  he  had,  in  rapid  succession,  vanquished  Christian, 
Francis  Joseph,  and  Napoleon,  it  was  the  turn  of  Arnim, 
Pius,  and  Augusta.  That  did  not  suffice  him.  Gortscha- 
kow,  who  thought  himself  the  greater,  had  repeatedly 
annoyed  him.  The  conflict  was  carried  almost  to  the 
point  of  war — even  by  depriving  him  of  his   railway 

*  The  original  has  "war,"  presumably  owing  to  a  misprint. 
— Translator. 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914       43 

saloon.  This  gave  rise  to  the  miserable  Triple  Alliance. 
At  last  came  the  conflict  with  William,  in  which  the 
mighty  one  was  vanquished,  as  Napoleon  was  vanquished 
by  Alexander. 

Political  life-and-death  unions  only  prosper  if  founded 
on  a  constitutional  basis  and  not  on  an  international 
one.  They  are  all  the  more  questionable  if  the  partner 
is  feeble.  Bismarck  never  meant  the  Alliance  to  take 
this  form. 

He  always  treated  the  English  with  forbearance;  he 
knew  that  this  was  wiser.  He  always  paid  marked  re- 
spect to  the  old  Queen  Victoria,  despite  his  hatred  of 
her  daughter  and  of  political  Anglomania;  the  learned 
Beaconsfield  and  the  worldly-wise  Salisbury  he  courted; 
and  even  that  strange  Gladstone,  whom  he  did  not  like, 
really  had  nothing  to  complain  about. 

The  Ultimatum  to  Serbia  was  the  culminating  point 
of  the  policy  of  the  Berlin  Congress,  the  Bosnian  crisis, 
the  Conference  of  London:  but  there  was  yet  time  to 
turn  back. 

We  were  completely  successful  in  achieving  that  which 
above  all  other  things  should  have  been  avoided — the 
breach  with  Russia  and  England. 

Our  Future 

After  two  years*  fighting  it  is  obvious  that  we  dare  not 
hope  for  an  unconditional  victory  over  the  Russians, 
English,  French,  Italians,  Rumanians,  and  Americans,  or 
reckon  on  being  able  to  wear  our  enemies  down.  But 
we  can  obtain  a  peace  by  compromise  only  by  evacuat- 
ing the  occupied  territory,  tlie  retention  of  which  would 
in  any  event  be  a  burden  and  cause  of  weakness  to  us, 
and  would  involve  the  menace  of  further  wars.  There- 
fore ever}^hing  should  be  avoided  which  would  make 
it  more  difficult  for  those  enemy  groups  who  might  pos- 


44        My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914 

sibly  still  be  won  over  to  the  idea  of  a  peace  by  com- 
promise to  come  to  terms,  viz.,  the  British  Radicals  and 
the  Russian  Reactionaries.  From  this  point  of  view 
alone  the  Polish  scheme  is  to  be  condemned,  as  is  also 
any  infringement  of  Belgian  rights,  or  the  execution  of 
British  citizens — to  say  nothing  of  the  insane  U-boat 
plan. 

"Our  future  lies  on  the  water."  Quite  right;  there- 
fore it  is  not  in  Poland  and  Belgium,  in  France  and 
Serbia.  This  is  a  return  to  the  days  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  and  the  mistakes  of  the  Hohenstaufens  and 
Habsburgs.  It  is  the  policy  of  the  Plantagenets,  not  that 
of  Drake  and  Raleigh,  Nelson  and  Rhodes.  The  policy 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  is  a  return  to  the  past,  a  turning 
aside  from  the  future,  from  imperialism  and  a  world- 
policy.  "Middle  Europe"  belongs  to  the  Middle  Ages, 
Berlin-Bagdad  is  a  blind  alley  and  not  the  way  into  the 
open  country,  to  unlimited  possibilities,  to  the  world- 
mission  of  the  German  nation. 

I  am  no  enemy  of  Austria,  or  Hungary,  or  Italy,  or 
Serbia,  or  any  other  state,  but  only  of  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance policy,  which  was  bound  to  divert  us  from  our 
aims  and  bring  us  onto  the  inclined  plane  of  a  Conti- 
nental policy.  It  was  not  the  German  policy,  but  that 
of  the  Austrian  Imperial  House.  The  Austrians  had 
come  to  regard  the  Alliance  as  an  umbrella  under  the 
shelter  of  which  they  could  make  excursions  to  the  Near 
East  when  they  thought  fit. 

And  what  must  we  expect  as  the  result  of  this  war  of 
nations?  The  United  States  of  Africa  will  be  British, 
like  those  of  America,  Australia  and  Oceania.  And  the 
Latin  states  of  Europe,  as  I  predicted  years  ago,  will 
enter  into  the  same  relations  with  the  United  Kingdom 
that  their  Latin  sisters  in  America  maintain  with  the 
United  States.  The  Anglo-Saxon  will  dominate  them. 
France,  exhausted  by  the  war,  will  only  attach  herself 


My  Mission  to  London  1912-1914        45 

still  more  closely  to  Great  Britain.  Nor  will  Spain 
continue  to  resist  for  long. 

And  in  Asia  the  Russians  and  the  Japanese  will  spread 
and  will  carry  their  customs  with  their  frontiers,  and 
the  South  will  remain  to  the  British. 

The  world  will  belong  to  the  Anglo-Saxons,  Russians, 
and  Japanese,  and  the  German  will  remain  alone  with 
Austria  and  Hungary,  His  rule  will  be  that  of  thought 
and  of  commerce,  not  that  of  the  bureaucrat  and  the 
soldier.  He  made  his  appearance  too  late,  and  his 
last  chance  of  making  good  the  past,  that  of  founding 
a  Colonial  Empire,  was  annihilated  by  the  world-war. 

For  we  shall  not  supplant  the  sons  of  Ichwe.  Then 
will  be  realised  the  plan  of  the  great  Rhodes,  who  saw 
the  salvation  of  humanity  in  the  expansion  of  Britondom 
— in  British  Imperialism. 

Tu  regere  imperio  populos,  Romane,  memento. 
Hae  tibi  erunt  artes :  pacisque  imponere  morem, 
Parcere  subjectis  et  debellare  superbos. 


\JC 


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